F. L. Woodward, with the author's kind regards

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CONTENTS

PAGE

BIGGERSTAFF, KNIGHT, Some Notes on the *Tung-hua lu* and the *Shih-lu* 101

COOMARASWAMY, Ananda K., Some Pāli Words 116

REVIEWS:

J. K. SHRYOCK, *The Study of Human Abilities* . . 191

BIBLIOGRAPHY 193

Annuaire de l'école pratique des hautes études 193, *Antiquity* 193, *Artibus Asiae* 193, *The British Museum Quarterly* 197, *Bulletin of the Boston Museum of Fine Arts* 197, *Bulletin of Fogg Art Museum* 197, *Bulletin de la société de linguistique de Paris* 198, *Bulletin de la société française de philosophie* 198, *Bulletin of Metropolitan Museum of Fine Arts* 198, *Comptes-rendus de l'académie des inscriptions et belles lettres* 199, *The Illustrated London News* 199, *The Indian Historical Quarterly* 200, *Journal des savants* 203, *Monumenta serica* 203, *Ostasiatische Zeitschrift* 205, *Revue de l'histoire des religions* 206, *Revue des arts asiatiques* 207, *Revue d'histoire et de philosophie religieuses* 208, *Scientia* 209, *Sinica* 209, *Transactions and Proceedings of the Japan Society*, London 210.

BOOKS AND ARTICLES RECEIVED 211

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SOME PĀLI WORDS

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"For an accurate understanding of the original meaning of most of the technical terms of Buddhism a knowledge of their Sanskrit form is indispensable" (MAX MÜLLER, *SBE* 10. liv).[1]

In the following article certain Pāli words are discussed, with particular reference to their treatment in the PTS Dictionary and to their translation in the now completed Nikāya volumes of the PTS. References are to the corresponding editions, by volume and page: other abbreviations as in the PTS Dictionary. The discussions of *Attha (artha)*, *Rasa, Vyañjana* and *Sahājanetta* amount to a first essay in the study of Buddhist rhetoric, and should be read together.

Akaniṭṭha. The Dictionary misses the full meaning of this word in its context, S. 5. 237, J. 3. 487, etc. It is not "'not the smaller,' i. e. the greatest, highest" but "amongst whom there is none

[1] To this I would add that Buddhist doctrine is very largely addressed directly to learned Brahman hearers, already familiar with almost all of the technical terms in their Sanskrit forms and with the Indian rather than the specifically Buddhist content of the words: it follows that the more we can approach the texts from the same point of view, the better we shall be able to grasp them. Buddhism presupposes the Brahmanical position and for the most part is only in conflict with actual or supposed perversions of this position.

In so far as Buddhism is an argument addressed to a learned audience it is an argument that presupposes a knowledge of the Vedas and Upaniṣads; if we are not equipped with a similar knowledge, we can hardly expect to understand more of the Dhamma that is "deep, deep in meaning, transcendental and coupled with negation" (*te ye suttantā gambhīrā gambhīratthā lokuttarā suññatā-paṭisaññutā*, A. I. 72, S. 11. 267 etc.) than is directly addressed to the "untaught many-folk" (*assuta puthujjana*, "the man in the street").

In connection with the Buddhist commentaries, it may be remarked here that Buddhaghosa did not know Sanskrit or the history of Sanskrit terms, and in at least some cases interprets Pāli words in a fashion dependent on special usages in his own period; his treatment of *uṇhīsa* is a case in point. Hence, what a Brahman auditor face to face with the Buddha may be supposed to have understood by a given term may often represent its real value in "original Buddhism" better than the interpretation of a later Buddhist commentator.

younger (or lesser) than another." The Devas in question can only be the Maruts of whom "None is come forth superior or inferior, or is waxen of medium glory" (*te ajyeṣṭhā akaniṣṭāsa udbhido*[2] *madhyamāso mahasā vi vavṛdhuḥ*, RV. 5. 59. 6), but "as brothers have waxen together," RV. 5. 60. 5. As Vāyu is metaphysically the "Gale of the Spirit," so are these Storm-winds "Blasts of the Spirit." It will not be overlooked that in MU. 2.1 Bṛhadratha (of the Īkṣvākuvaṁśa, also the Buddha's) who is about to become an *ātmajñaḥ* (Pāli *attaññū*) and *kṛtakṛtyaḥ* (Pāli *katakicco, kataṁ karaṇīyam*) is reputed a Marut, and *ib.* 6.30 where he is actually *kṛtakṛtyaḥ* ("all in act") and enters through the Sundoor into the Brahmaloka, he is no longer referred to by a personal or family name, but only as "Marut." The Buddhist phrase *akaniṭṭhāgāmin*, which occurs with *pariṇibbāyin* in a list of designations of "Never-returners" in several contexts (D. 3. 237 etc.), implies accordingly the attainment of the Brahmaloka and of companionship on equal terms with the highest Devas, the Blasts of the Spirit, amongst whom there is no distinction of superior or inferior or of early or late comers-in. Quite analogous to this is the position of the Comprehensor of whom it is often said, e. g. S. 1. 11, that he does not think of himself as "Equal, or better than, or inferior to others."

Malalasekara, in his *Dictionary of Pāli Proper Names*, cites from DA II. 480, Buddhaghosa's explanation of *akaniṭṭhā devā*. In this citation, *sabbeh'eva* should be *sabbe h'eva*. Moreover, B. does not give two different explanations of the name, but only one: the *akaniṭṭha* deities are so called because none amongst them is junior in attainment and virtues.[3]

Akāliko. In S. 1. 11-13 a Yakkhī asks of the Buddha what is meant by the designation of the Dhamma as "intemporal" (*akāliko*), i. e. "eternal." The Buddha answers that it is only by the understanding of what-can-be-told that eternal life can be

[2] *Udbhidaḥ* in the sense of MU. 6. 30 *sauraṁ dvāram bhitvā = ūrdhvam . . . yo bhitvā sūryamaṇḍalam*, again with reference to a Marut.

[3] The implications of *akaniṭṭha* are similar to those of the well-known Parable of the Vineyard, Matth. 20. 1-16. Cf. "for all shall know Him, from the least even unto the greatest of them" (Jer. 31. 34) and Augustine's discussion in *De spiritu et littera*, 41.

attained: " Those who heed only what can be told (*akkheyyam*, i.e. the tale itself, *ākhyānam*), who rest on what can be told, who do not fully comprehend what can be told, these come under the yoke of Death: but one who fully comprehends what can be told, makes no debate about the teller (*akkhatāraṁ na maññati*, the reference of *akkhatāro* being to the Buddha himself, as in Sn. 167), reflecting (*iti*) 'It is not "*his*"' (*taṁ hi tassa na hoti*), and so makes no mistake (*yena naṁ vajjā na tassa atthi*)." The Yakkhī does not understand and asks the Buddha " to explain in detail the meaning of what has been said in brief " (*saṁkhittena bhāsitassa vitthārena atthaṁ jāneyyam*). The Buddha then more explicitly states the doctrine of *ākimcañña* by means of which he has already answered at one and the same time the Yakkhī's mistaken reference to the Buddha as " surrounded by other mighty Devatās " and her actual question as to the meaning of " timeless " (*akāliko*): " He is contrarious (*vivadetha*, with reference to the preceding *vajjā tassa*) who thinks in terms of 'Equal, better or worse,' " i.e. who thinks of the Buddha as " someone." Still she does not understand (as before). More explicitly the Buddha says " He that has done with 'number,' *him* neither gods nor men, whether here below or there beyond, can reach " (*pahāsi saṅkham . . . tam . . . nājjhagāmum devā manussā idha vā huraṁ vā*). At last she understands the Buddha's meaning (*attham*): " timeless " can only apply to a doctrine that has not been taught by " someone "; the *dhamma* is *akāliko* as being, not the " dated " " view " of So-and-so (whether man or personal deity is irrelevant), but Truth itself. Neither the Buddha nor the Dhamma are " in time," but only their manifestations, which must not be taken absolutely, but must be penetrated and seen through. The designation of Dhamma as " timeless " is the Buddhist form of the well-known Indian doctrine of the " eternity of the Veda," for which there are good Christian equivalents, e.g. St. AUGUSTINE, *De lib. arb.* 1.6 *Lex, quae summa ratio nominatur, non potest cuipiam intelligenti non incommutabilis aeternaque videri*; St. THOMAS AQUINAS, *Sum. Theol.* 1-2, 91. 1 *divina ratio nihil concipit ex tempore*, etc. " Dhamma " could hardly be rendered in Latin better than by *Lex, quae summa ratio nominatur . . . aeterna . . . divina*

ratio. The modern scholar's objection to the doctrine of the eternity of the Word, Law or Dhamma is based on a misunderstanding of what is meant; as remarked by St. Thomas Aquinas, *ib.*, "the Divine Word and the writing of the Book of Life (— which corresponds to the *vidyā* implied in "Jātavedas" and to "Providence"—) are eternal. But the *promulgation* cannot be from eternity on the part of the creature that hears or reads." The doctrine of the eternity of the *summa ratio* itself is the same as the Platonic doctrine of ideas; that of its temporal promulgation corresponding to the appearance of the shadows on the wall of the cave. In the Buddhist texts in the same way we find the Dhamma described in one breath as *diṭṭhe dhamme*, "here and now," and *akāliko*, "not in time." For, to borrow the words of AUGUSTINE, "This wisdom is not made; but it is at this present, as it hath ever been, and so shall ever be" (*Conf.* 9.10). There are many other texts in which the Buddha identifies himself, the Dhamma, and Brahma; the Dhamma is accordingly temporal and intemporal just as the Brahman, single essence with two natures, is *kāla* and *akāla* (MU. 6.15 etc.), "time and timeless," and therewith also *sakala* and *akala*, "with and without parts." Otherwise expressed, Brahman is on the one hand the audible *brahman* = *mantram*, and on the other silent: *śabda* and *aśabda*, "vocal and silent."

Akiriyavāda. Just as in Brahmanism (e.g. TB. 3.12.9.7-8; JUB. 1.5.1-2; CU. 8.4.4; BU. 4.4.23; KU. 2.14; Kauṣ Up. 1.4; MU. 6.18, 35; BG. 5.15 etc.) and in Christianity (1 John. 3.9; 2 Cor. 3.17; Gal. 5.18; St. THOMAS AQUINAS, *Sum. Theol.* 1-2.93.6 ad 1 and 2-2.180.2) ethical values are in the last analysis to be rejected and all responsibility ceases, so in Pāli Buddhism (M. 1.135, 160; M. 2.36-39; Dh. 39, 267, 412; Sn. 715, etc.); it follows, indeed, as a matter of course that when the whole burden of *kamma* (the operation of mediate causes, or "fate") is laid down for ever, the relative factors of this burden (what ought to have been done and was not done, and what ought not to have been done but was done) are likewise discarded; this abandonment of ethical values inevitably accompanying the abandonment of the

psycho-physical "self" (Pāli *appātumo, pāpa attā, anattā*), an abandonment that is styled in Brahmanism "self-sacrifice" or "self-conquest" (*ātma-yajña, ātma-jaya*), in Christianity "self-naughting" (ECKHART's "the soul must put itself to death," Christ's "hating one's own soul" and St. Paul's "dividing asunder of soul from spirit"), in Buddhism "self-conquest" (*atta-jaya*), "self-dompting" (*atta-damatha*), "self-allaying" (*atta-samatha*), "self-extinction" (*atta-parinibbāpana*) or more explicitly and technically the attainment of the "station of not being anyone" (*ākiṁcaññāyatana*).

It will be seen that the ultimate negation of all responsibility is a purely metaphysical and contemplative position: it can have no applicable meaning for anyone who still is "someone," still "active" or in other words still "alive." To argue that "I," So-and-so, am not a responsible agent would be a ridiculous confusion of thought: it is only the I that is *not* a So-and-so that is free of the burden of responsibility, only one born of God, and in the spirit, that cannot sin. To pretend that this can apply to "me" (So-and-so) is to interpret the doctrine of filiation and theosis in the Satanic sense of the paranoiac. There have nevertheless been some modern scholars who have pretended to see in the "That art thou" of the Upaniṣads just such a deification as this; and have been "shocked" accordingly: and some others, the Amaurians for example, who were charged with maintaining that "as every human act is the act of God, there is no distinction between good and evil, and hence Nature should not be refused anything."[1] We are concerned here only with the latter sort of heretics, those whose heresy or "false view (*micchā diṭṭhi*) is termed in Pāli Buddhism *akiriyavāda*, the proposition viz. that inasmuch as deeds are done without a doer,[2] it does not matter what "I" do, whether good or evil (D. 1. 53): as against this position, the Buddha proclaims himself a *kiriyavādī, and* an *akiriyavādī* inasmuch as he teaches both what ought-to-be-done and ought-not-to-be-done (Vin. 1. 233 f., and A. 1. 62); but a *kiriyavādī only* in the sense of "one who teaches that there is an

[1] M. DE WULF, *History of Mediaeval Philosophy*, 3rd ed. 1935, p. 235.
[2] See "Ahaṁkāra."

ought-to-be-done" in opposition to the *akiriyavādī* whose teaching is that there is no "ought-to-be-done" (D. 1. 115); these distinctions depending on a word division *akiriya-vādī* (teacher of an ought-not-to-be-done) and *a-kiriya-vādī* (not the teacher of an ought-to-be-done).[3]

In A. 2. 232 Gotama is accused of *a-kiriyavāda*, the accuser maintaining that he "teaches that there is no ought-to-be-done with respect to any acts" (*sabbakammānam akiriyam paññāpeti*), and it is of interest that in the course of the refutation the Buddha points out that *akiriya* (the word might be rendered by "laissez-faire" in this context) amounts to an annihilation of the world (*ucchedam . . . lokassa*), "of which the very subsistence consists in the verity, i. e. causal efficacy, of action" (*kammasacca*, to be understood as in A. 2. 197-198 with respect to any bodily, vocal or mental activity, *kāya-*, *vācī-* and *mano-samārambha*), an argument reminiscent of BG. 3. 8 *śarīra-yātrāpi ca te na prasiddhyed akarmaṇaḥ* and 3. 24 *utsīdeyur ime lokā na kuryā karma ced aham*.[4] It is indeed for this very reason that the Buddha sets the Wheel in motion in response to the desire of all the Devas, voiced by Brahmā, who exclaims that otherwise "The world is lost!" *nassati . . .*, *vinassati* (J. 1. 81, S. 1. 136 f., M. 1. 168, etc.). It is expressly stated too that the Buddha "practises what he

[3] There are actually three different ways in which the *akiriyavādī* claims irresponsibility (cf. J. 5. 228). In A. 1. 173 the translation of *akiriya* by "inaction" is mistaken; for inaction we should require *akammma* corresponding to *akarma* in BG. 4. 16. As a false "view," *akiriya* means "no *ought* to be done": as a "right view," that there is "an *ought not* to be done." The three grounds on which an irresponsibility is based are (1) fatalism, actions being the effect of past acts over which we have no control, (2) actions are not our acts but those of the Lord (*issara*), and (3) actions are uncaused and unmotivated (*ahetu, appacaya*): as against all these the Buddha maintains that "this should be done, or should not be done" (*idaṁ vā karaṇīyaṁ vā akaraṇīyam*), and it is in this sense also that he calls himself both *kiriyavādī* and *akiriyavādī*, as above.

[4] The Buddha's doctrine was evidently as much misunderstood or wrongly reported by some in his own day as it has been misunderstood by some modern scholars (notably those who saw in *nibbāna* "annihilation"). In M. 1. 140, for example, we find him accused of teaching the "cutting off, destruction and becoming naught of existent entities" (*sato-satassa ucchedaṁ vināsaṁ vibhavam*). He protests that the accusation is "naughtily, vainly, falsely made and contrary to what is fact" (*asatā tucchā musā abhūtena*), for "This is just what I do *not* teach."

preaches" (*yathā vādī tathā kārī*, A. 2. 23, reminiscent of RV. 4. 33. 6 *satyam ūcur nara eva hi cakruḥ* and 9. 113. 5 *satya-vadan-t-satya-karman*): as it is the Arhat, passim, that he has "done what was to be done"[5] (*katakicco, kataṁ karaṇīyam*, corresponding to the Brahmanical *kṛta-kṛtyaḥ*).[6]

We can see now easily, then, how it can be that while in Udāna 70 the notion that "I am the doer" is scouted (see "Ahaṁkāra), in Udāna 45 the man "who even when he acts yet says 'I am not the agent'" (*yo cāpi katvā na karomiti cāha*) is likewise condemned. As in Christian doctrine, the moral virtues do not belong to the contemplative life essentially, but only dispositively, while they do belong to the active life essentially.

Attā. (1) *Attā* can be equated with *kāya* only in the reflexive sense. For example, in D. 1. 34 *añño attā dibbo rūpī manomayo* corresponds to D. 1. 77 *aññaṁ kāyam . . . rūpiṁ manomayam* (also in M. 2.17). This does not imply that *attā* can be translated by "body," meaning simply the flesh: on the contrary, "body" is used to mean the whole psycho-physical personality, just as in English we speak of "somebody," or as in "gin a body meet a body," and also make use of "soul" in the same way in such expressions as "not a soul was to be seen." *Añño attā* and *añño kāyo* are much rather what we mean by "another man," a "new being" than either "spirit" or "body" in the stricter sense of these words. *Kāya* is found again in the general sense of "person" (*quisque*) in M. 1. 206, where three young men are leading the higher life in one company: one of them says "I live in obedience to the will of these venerable (comrades), surrendering my private will (*sakaṁ cittam*); we, Sir, are many men (*nānā . . . kāyā*, several 'bodies'), but most assuredly one will" (*ekaṁ cittam*). In A. 1. 168 (cf. 2. 68) we find both *attā* and (instead of *kāya*) *sarīra* employed in the same sense of *quis* or *quisque* = *kaścit*: the objection is raised that this is the perfecting of only

[5] Not simply, of course, in the sense of "duty done," but that of "having done what was to be done," i. e. "having reduced all potentiality to act" and being therefore "all in act."

[6] Note the dramatic distinction of *kṛtakṛtyah* "having reduced potentiality to act" from *kṛtyākṛtaḥ*, "doer of evil," "worker of witchcraft," in AV. 4. 17. 4.

one person (*ekam attānam . . . parinibbāpeti*), that this is an acquisition of merit affecting only "somebody" (*ekasarīrakam puññapaṭipadam paṭipanno hoti*); the Buddha shows that the monk's abandonment of the world affects not only himself, but is "everybody-ish" (*anekasarīrakā*).

The Dictionary notes the meaning *quis* or *quisque* only s. v. *tuma* (= *attā* = Skr. *tman* = *ātman*).

(2) One of the most remarkable examples of what Mrs. RHYS DAVIDS would call a "left in" in late Pāli literature occurs in J. 6. 252, where *kāyo te ratha-saññāto . . . attā vā sārathi* corresponds to KU. 3. 3 *ātmānaṁ rathinaṁ viddhi, śarīraṁ ratham eva tu.* The text is of utmost importance in connection with the "Chariot Parable" elsewhere, notably in S. 1. 135 and Mil.[1] In the latter passage, so well known, it is shown that just as there is no "chariot" apart from the sum of the component parts to which the name of "chariot" is conventionally given so there is no "Nāgasena" apart from the psycho-physical components of the variable phenomenon to which the name of "Nāgasena" is conventionally given; the psycho-physical composite is *anattā*, here and throughout our texts, there is nothing but a phenomenon (*rūpa*) to which a name (*nāma*) can be given.

Observe now that just as the repeated analyses of the psycho-physical constitution of the so-called individual end invariably with the words *na me so attā*, "*that* is not my 'self,' or 'spiritual essence,'" so Nāgasena shows that in all that can be named, whether "chariot" or "Nāgasena," no self-subsistent being or persistent substance can be found. Nāgasena no more denies that there may be a charioteer distinct from the chariot, or a principle distinct from all that can be called "Nāgasena," than the words *na me so attā* can be made to mean "there is no *attā*." He leaves out the rider altogether, only because his immediate purpose, like

[1] We do not overlook that Milinda himself is referred to as the rider, but this is merely to introduce the subject of the parable. If Nāgasena had gone on to apply the parable not only to himself but also to Milinda, it is the psycho-physical personality by name "Milinda" that would have been analysed, and Nāgasena might well have said to him, *na vo so attā*, "all that is not your essence," still without touching upon the nature of an essence thus defined by elimination, that spiritual essence to which we here, in accordance with J. 6. 252, refer to as the "rider" or "charioteer."

the Buddha's in so many texts, is to break down the belief in a "self" that is either physical or psychic. He has nothing to say, therefore, about a rider to whom no name can be given, that other "self" (*ātman*) of KU. 2. 25 that "hath never become anyone" (*na babhūva kaścit*), a self that can only be defined by the elimination of all that it is not, but which is assuredly the substance of all those Buddhist saints who, like the Buddha himself, had realised that all phenomena are *anattā*, and had attained to the "Station of Not-being-Anyone" (*ākiñcaññāyatana*). And we can well say with Udāna 80 that "if there were not this Unborn, Unbecome, Non-effected, Incomposite, there would be no way to escape from this world of birth, becoming, effection and composition."

If the Buddha himself is the "most luminous and foremost charioteer" (*sārathi*, Sn. 83), if Dhamma is the charioteer (S. 1. 33), Attā the charioteer (J. 6. 252), and the chariot conversely "enspirited" (*attaniya*,[2] S. 5. 6), all these are equivalent formulae: the Buddha is the Spirit, and it is only when He holds the reins, only when the Great Self (*mahattā*, A. 1. 249) is in control, that the contemplative therewith "drives off and away from this world" in what is called the Brahma-vehicle or Dhamma-vehicle (S. 5. 6).[3]

Attha (= *artha*). In A. 1. 151 the qualifications of the teacher and the hearer of Dhamma (the Doctrine as taught, *desitam, akkhyātam* etc.) are that each separately and both together must be able to receive (*paṭisaṁvedeti*)[1] both the *attha* and the

[2] Certainly not here with any pejorative value! In the many contexts in which *attā* and *attaniya*, "self and self-ish" or "essence and essential" are denied (e. g. M. 1. 297), the reference is to the composite vehicle itself, the soul-and-body that are "not my very-Self" (*na me so attā*) but the pseudo- or "petty self" (*appātumo*, A. 1. 249). All our texts maintain that there is no entity of the chariot itself, but only the name and the appearance thereof; none of them affirm that there is no rider.

In S. 5. 6, WOODWARD's rendering of *attaniyam bhūtam* as "built by self" betrays the meaning: *attaniyam* is "enspirited," *bhūtam* is *geworden*; it is in a vehicle of which *attā* is in control that the contemplatives "drive away."

[3] *Brahmayānam anuttaram niyyanti dhīvā lokaṁhā.*

[1] In *paṭisaṁvedeti*, *prati* is *secundum* and *sam* corresponds to *co* (= *cum*) in *cognoscere*: *pratisaṁvid* is *cognoscere secundum rem*. An *adaequatio rei et intellectus* is implied.

dhamma.[2] WOODWARD renders "must be able to penetrate both the letter and the spirit thereof" and adds in a footnote that "*Attha* is the primary, or surface meaning: *dhamma* the applied meaning."[3] He does not realize that his word "thereof" implies that there is a *dhamma* of a *dhamma*. There can be no doubt that what is intended is "must be able to receive both the application and the substance" of the teaching.

In the section immediately following, it is said that the same qualifications are prerequisite if the discourse (*kathā*) is to be effective (*pavattanī*, rendered by WOODWARD "profitable" here and in the similar context A. 1. 125), i. e. are to *move* the hearer so that action results.

Before going further, let us observe that Skr. *artha* is the purpose, reason, use, value, application and function, as well as the meaning, of whatever it may be that is referred to:[4] and that whereas in "primitive" thought function and meaning coincide, we who no longer think in terms of adequate symbols are unable

[2] Cf. Sn., prose preceding verse 1124, where we find that to every question an answer can be given in terms of *attha* or of *dhamma* accordingly, Dh. 363, *atthaṁ dhammaṁ ca dīpeti . . . tam āhu bhikkhum*. Cf. M. 1. 37, A. 2. 239, etc., *attha-veda* and *dhamma-veda*, as knowledge of or devotion to both *attha* and *dhamma*, "the law and the prophets."

[3] "Letter and spirit" is used in two senses, neither of which is that of "surface meaning and applied meaning." The two senses are (1) the most familiar, and that was developed by ORIGEN (*De principiis*, Bk. 4, cc. 8-20), viz. that the literal meaning is no more than the symbol of the intended meaning a figure of speech to be interpreted, as for example when it is said that of *samudda* the *adhivacanam* is *nibbāna*; and (2) that emphasized by St. AUGUSTINE in *De spiritu et littera*, in which "letter" refers to the moral law; this is the "letter that kills" inasmuch as it is by this law that the offender is condemned; while on the other hand the "spirit" is the Holy Ghost at work within the soul, imparting the knowledge of God by which those who are dead unto sin but live in Christ are liberated from the Law. *Attha* and *dhamma* could be rendered by "letter and spirit" in AUGUSTINE's sense, *attha* being the "applied meaning" and *dhamma* the "ultimate meaning": the distinction is that of *karmakāṇḍa* from *jñānakāṇḍa*, and it may be in this sense that the PTS. Dictionary rightly distinguishes, s. v. Veda, *attha* from *dhamma* as the letter from the spirit of the Buddha's teaching, though WOODWARD's note, which gives for *dhamma* the meaning that belongs to *attha* shows that he is *not* using "letter and spirit" in their original, Pauline sense.

[4] For example, in S. 1. 34 (also Vin. 11. 147) *sampassam attham attano* is rendered "seeing his own good," but could also be translated "seeing the meaning of 'self (*attā*)."

to deal with function and meaning by a single act of the mind. This has a marked effect upon our theories of art, whether literary or plastic. It must be realized that from the Indian, as from the Scholastic point of view, it cannot be said that the meaning of a phrase has been conveyed otherwise than to the extent that the hearer acts upon what he is supposed to have understood.[5] In other words, the Dhamma cannot be understood apart from its application.

In A. 2. 7 we find accordingly that the man who has learnt but little understands neither the application (*attha*) nor the substance of the Law (*dhamma*), and so by his audition (*sutena*) is "unborn" (*anupanno*, an expression that vividly recalls JUB. 3. 14. 8, "Verily is a man unborn insofar as he does not sacrifice"). Woodward's version is "knows not the letter (*attham*), knows not the meaning" (*dhammam*), the very reverse of what is intended. In Udāna 70, however, where we have "The blind, the unseeing, know neither the meaning nor what is not the meaning (*attham, anattham*, i. e. how to apply and how not to apply), nor the text itself nor what is not the text (*dhammam, adhammam*, i. e. do not know when the doctrine has been correctly and when incorrectly stated), Woodward's version "know not the profitable (*attham*) . . . know not *dhamma*" is much nearer the mark. In Udāna 6, "He is pure, he is a Brahman, in whom are Truth and Doctrine" (*saccaṁ ca dhammo ca*), *saccam* (= *satyam*) takes the place of *attham* and amounts to *vera sentenzia*.

The foregoing interpretations of *attha* and *dhamma* are confirmed by two Jātaka texts. In J. 6. 389 we find the Bodhisattva instructing a king, Cowell and Rouse translating *atthaṁ ca dhammaṁ ca anusāsati* by "used to instruct the king in things

[5] It is for this reason that the traditional Indian scholar feels that the deliberately objective and detached methods of modern scholarship (adopted as Jung has said "partly because of the *misérable vanité des savants* which fears and rejects with horror any sign of living sympathy, and partly because an understanding that reaches the feelings might allow contact with the foreign spirit to become a serious experience") can never lead to more than a superficial grasp of any doctrine. It is only when we ourselves participate in the quest and are hunters ourselves that we can understand the terms of venery, not as disinterested lookers-on.

temporal and spiritual "; [6] the reference is unmistakeably to Arthaśāstra and Dharmaśāstra, a meaning quite in agreement with the relative values found for *attha* and *dhamma* above. Finally we have J. 6. 251-2, where the king requests the Bodhisattva to teach him *atthaṁ ca dhammaṁ ca*, "policy and doctrine" (Cowell and Rouse misrender by "the sacred text and its meaning," reversing the sense of the terms). The Bodhisattva accordingly teaches him how to act; he is to protect Brāhmaṇas and Samanas; to feed the hungry; he should not put to labour the aged man, or ox or horse, but give to each their due, since they served him when they were strong; in short, he is to avoid unrighteousness and follow righteousness. Then "The Great Person, having discoursed to him concerning liberality and morals (*dāna* and *sīla*) . . . proceeded to instruct him in the Law (*dhamma*) by means of the parable of the chariot that grants all wishes." This parable of the chariot begins "Thy body is called the chariot," and concludes "The Spirit is the charioteer" (*kāyo te ratha-saññāto . . . attā vā sārathi*, almost verbally identical with KU. 3. 3). We have here an actual example of what was implied by *attha* and what by *dhamma*.[7]

The foregoing analysis will be essential to the discussions of *rasa* and *vyañjana* below; see also *Sahājanetta*.

Attham (= *asta*). Pāli *attha* is not only Skr. *artha*, meaning, purpose, etc. (see "Vyañjana"), but sometimes Skr. *astam*, "home." In this sense the word occurs in Sn. 1074-1076: the Muni, gone out as a flame is blown out by the wind, and released from denomination and embodiment, "goes home (*attham paleti*)[1] and is not

[6] The same words occur in J. 6. 131, where they are rightly translated in the same way.

[7] It need hardly be emphasized that in the present article we are dealing entirely with *attha* as contrasted with *dhamma* (or *vyañjana*), not with *attha* in the very frequent and simple sense of "meaning" for which the example of A. 5. 194 "Here in the world, it is by means of a parable that such men as are of ready wit understand the meaning of what has been said" (*upamayam idh'ekacce viññū purisā bhāsitassa attham ājānanti*) will suffice.

[1] Max Müller's version in SBE is very defective and far too free. To have "gone home" in this anagogical sense is certainly to have "disappeared" from the field of objective perception, whether human or angelic, but we are not therefore justified in translating *atthaṁ gato* by "disappeared": it is always important to retain the literal meaning on which all other meanings depend. Nor is Max Müller's alternative, "Has

reborn" (*na upeti saṅkhaṁ*, see "Saṅkha"); it is asked, In the case of one thus "gone home" (*atthaṁ gato*), whether or not he "is" and whether he is forever well; the answer being that "For one 'gone home' there is no gauge, there is nothing by which he can be referred to,[2] when all qualities have been swept up, all wordways[3] too are swept up." The expression "gone home" derives from Brahmanical sources, where the Gale of the Spirit, the "One Whole Godhood" is the "home" to which the Sun himself and all separated essences return; for references see my "Svayamātṛṇṇā: Janua Coeli" (to appear immediately in *Zalmoxis*), Note 28.

Anatam. The printed text of *Udāna* 80 reads *duddassam anattaṁ nāma, na hi saccaṁ sudassanam*, but what is admittedly the best Ms. (A), and also at least one commentary, read *anatam* for *anattam*, and though the commentator understands by *anatam* "unbent," hence "*nibbāna*" (cf. K. S. 1, 236, note 4) and Woodward's rendering "infinite," it is almost certain that the meaning of the whole is "It is hard to discern what's false, nor easy to discern what's true," and that *anatam* here represents *anṛtam*, the regular antithesis of *satyam* in Sanskrit contexts. The reading *anattam* can be accounted for in two ways, either as an error on the part of the scribe, unfamiliar with the rare word *anatam* (not in PTS Dictionary, nor can I cite it elsewhere than as above;[1] or

he disappeared, or does he not exist?" the right one: the alternatives are posed with respect to one who *has* "gone home" (*atthaṁ-gato, so . . .*), about which "gone home" no question arises, the only question being as to what this "gone home" *implies*.

[2] As stated more fully in D. 11. 68, a locus classicus.

[3] *Vādapathā*: he has therefore entered into the silence of the unspoken word, *dharma* defined as in *Lalita Vistara*, text p. 423, "apart from any voice or sound of wordway, though the efficient cause of the voices of all beings" (*sarva-ruta-ghoṣa vākpathānītam . . . sarvasattva-ruta-racaṇam*). "Nothing true can be said" of the *dharmakāya*, but only of *sambhogakāya* or *nirmāṇakāya*. In the same way the *dhamma* is *akāliko*, "not *ex tempore*," but like the *akāla* Brahman of MU. 6. 15 "without parts," and like the *amūrta* Brahman of BU. 2. 3. 1 "immortal."

[1] The contrast of true and false in Pāli is usually *saccam musam*, as in A. 2. 25, an interesting context in which the relativity of "true and false," in the factual sense, is emphasized; the Tathāgata is not circumscribed by these systematic fences (*saṁvutesu*

cf A. 1. 149 attā te purisa jānāti saccam vā yadi vā musā

less probably by the fact that what is *anattam* is also *anatam* = *anṛtam*, as could easily be shown in sense from Pāli sources, e. g. A. 1. 149, where of man's two selves, the "fair" (*kalyāṇa*) is true (*saccam*), the "foul" (*pāpa*) false (*musā*), M. 1. 135 where the psycho-physical ego is "unreal" (*asat*), and similarly Dh. 368; or literally from Brahmanical sources, particularly VS. 1. 5 and SB. 1. 9. 3. 23, cf. AB. 7. 24, and SB. 3. 9. 4. 2 ("The Devas are the truth and men untruth").

Ahaṁkāra. *Udāna* 70, "Those who give ear to the notion 'I am the doer' (*ahaṁkāra*), or are captivated by the notion 'Another is the doer' (*paraṁkāra*), do not understand this matter, they have not seen the point": in A. 3. 337 *attakāra* replaces *ahaṁkāra* and means the notion that "a self, or oneself, is the doer"; in S. 2. 252 and parallel passages it is a question of realizing that "There is no 'I' that does, no 'mine' that is the doer, no latent 'I am'" (*ahaṁkāra-mamaṁkāra-*[*asmi-*]*mānānusayā na honti*), whether subjective or objective. The sense makes it clear that *ahaṁkāra* is really a "Karmadhāraya" compound, and not literally the "ego-factor" or "I-maker," but the notion that "I am the doer." Nor can there be much doubt that the same applies in Brahmanical contexts where, just as in many other traditions, the notion that "I am the doer" (*karto'ham iti*, BG. 3. 27, where it is inasmuch as he so thinks that the self of the man is "deluded by *ahaṁkāra*") is scouted, cf. BG. 5. 8, JUB. 1. 5. 2, etc. It may be observed that a verification of "not being the doer" can only be made by one who has attained the "station of not being anyone" (*ākiṁcaññāyatanam*). That "I am not the doer" is a metaphysical position, not a moral one, and must not be confused with the *akiriyavāda* heresy, that of the man who in *Udāna* 45 "even whilst acting says that 'It is not I that am agent'" (*yo c'āpi katvā na karomī'ti c'āha*) and as in D. 1. 53 that it is therefore a matter of indifference whether one does good or evil: so

= *saṁvṛtteṣu*); Buddhas are not interested in "facts." In this connection it may be observed that "fact" and "fiction" are both equally what we "make of" our "experience."

long as "I am who I am," "this man," I cannot lay down the burden of my responsibility so easily, but only at the end of the road, at world's end, and as one "born of God" and no longer "myself" that I am "not under the law" (Gal. 5.18).

Ahetuvāda. A *micchā diṭṭhi*, in A. 2. 31 grouped with *akiriyavāda* and *natthikavāda*. Also in M. 1. 408; and synonymous with *ahetukavāda* in S. 3. 210. The denial of causality, i. e. *kamma* as the operation of mediate causes, cf. A. 1. 173 f., *pubbe kata hetu* "by the effect of what was formerly done": a denial of the very core of Buddhist doctrine expressed in the so-called confession *Ye dhammā hetupabhavā . . .*, Vin. 1. 40 and in countless inscriptions; a refusal to see things *yathā-bhūtam*, i. e. as effects only. The opposite, *hetuvāda* (M. 1. 409) = *kammavāda* in A. 2. 31; the Buddha is a "causalist" (*kammavādī*), that is to say a "determinist" or "fatalist" (in the Christian sense, where "fate lies in the created causes themselves" and "is the very disposition or series, i. e. order, of second causes," St. Thomas, *Sum. Theol.* 1. 116. 2, cf. Boethius, *De consol.* 5. 6), as regards all things that are *anattā*, i. e. the psycho-physical self composite of the five *khandhas*. It is traditional doctrine that "Nothing in the world happens by chance" (Augustine, QQ. 83. 34, approved by St. Thomas, *Sum. Theol.* 1. 116 1 ad 2); it is only the little-witted (*alpabuddhayaḥ*) who maintain that the world is not produced in any ordered sequence (*a-paraspara-bhūtam*, opp. of *yathā-bhūtam*) but is as it is only as the result of an exercise of free will (*kim anyat kāmahaitukam*), and this view is tantamount to a destruction of the world (*kṣayāya jagataḥ*, BG. 16. 8). It may be pointed out that it is only on the basis of a world order (κόσμος, *ṛta*) that the notions of an omniscience and omniscient "Providence" (*prajñā* as in Ait. Up. 5. 3, and passim) are intelligible; if "nothing happens by chance" the *possibility* of a Providence necessarily follows. In other words, it is only from the *hetuvāda, kammavāda* point of view that we can understand AA. 2. 3. 2 where the *avijñāna paśuvaḥ* (= Buddhist *puthujjana*) are said to "become such as they are, they verily are born in accordance with Providence" (*etāvantī bhavanti, yathā prajñaṁ*

hi bhavanti), BU. 4. 4. 2 where the *savijñānam* (*śarīram*) is "taken hold of by knowledge and works, and antecedent Providence" (*taṁ vidyā-karmaṇī samanvārabhete, pūrva-prajñā ca*), and BG. 18. 14 where beyond the four mediate causes (*hetu*) of whatever it may be that a man undertakes there is reckoned as a fifth the "Divine" (*daivyam*, sc. *prajñānam*, and admirably rendered by BARNETT as "Providence"). Our principal object in this section has been to bring out the consistency and interdependence of the Buddhist doctrines of *kamma* on the one hand and *sabbaññā* on the other.

Akoṭita. In S. 2. 281 *ākoṭitāni paccākoṭitāni civarāni*, the most correct translation would be, I think, "garments of material *calendered* on both sides."

Āsivisa. "Derivation uncertain" according to the PTS Dictionary. In any case the occurrence of the word is an interesting survival, as is that of *ahi*, both words occurring together in the Mahāvagga, 1. 24-25, where the *ahi-nāga* overcome by the Buddha in the Jaṭila fire-temple is described as *nāgarājā iddhimā āsiviso ghoraviso . . . makham asahamāno*. The word occurs in AB. 6. 1 where the *sarparṣi* and *mantrakṛt* Arbuda is an *āśiviṣaḥ*, "basilisk"; and in Avestan as *azhi-visha* in Azhi-vishapa. In S. 4. 172 the *āsivisā* are the four great families of snakes, and represent the Four Great Elements. *Visha* is certainly "poison"; *āsi* is probably Skr. *āśi* or *āśis* (perhaps from *āśi* to "sharpen") in the sense of "fang." *Āsivisa* would then mean "poison-fanged," either as adjective qualifying *ahi*, or as noun = snake.

Itthatā. The expression *nāparam itthatāya*, constantly concluding the series *khīna jāti, vusitam brahmacariyaṁ, kataṁ karaṇīyam* descriptive of the Arahat, is usually rendered either by "after this present world there is no beyond" or "there is no hereafter for him." These versions do not convey the meaning, and on the contrary state what is precisely the *natthika* heresy, which consists in the denial of a beyond (see "Natthika"). The meaning is that "there is no more such and suchness for him henceforth": it is not that there is "no beyond," but that it is

improper (*akallam*) to make any affirmation or denial about the state of the Arahat hereafter, it may not even be said that he does not see or know (D. 2. 68)[1]; his mode is modeless, we cannot say what he is because he is not any *what*. Far better is the rendering of *nāparam itthatāya* in M. 1. 184 by "There is no more of what I have been"; this, which is true of every death and rebirth is preeminently true of the thoroughly dead, *parinibbuto*.

Itthatā may be noted in A. 2. 82, with reference to change of occupation: "Dying thence, he is born to this" (*tato cuto itthatam āgacchati*): in the same way D. 3. 146, with reference to the Buddha's descent from the Tusita heaven, "dying thence he entered into this condition of things" (*tato cuto itthatam āgato*): *itthatā* as "thisness" being the finite aspect of *tathattā*, "thatness," i. e. *nibbāna*; just as one "comes to *this*" state of affairs, so one "goes on one's way to *that*" (*tathattāya paṭipajjati*, D. 1. 175 and S. 2. 199).

Itthatā is thus synonymous with *bhavābhava* (becoming in a given way, or not becoming in a given way), but not with *bhavaṁ ca vibhavaṁ ca* (becoming and not becoming, i. e. existence and non-existence). Thus in A. 2. 10 *iti-bhavābhava . . . taṇhā* (thirst for becoming thus, or not becoming so)[2] is a hindrance, the variant *ittha-bhāvaññatābhāvam = saṁsāra* occurring in the verses: in Sn. 752 it is precisely from this "being in this way or not being in some other way" that the non-returner is unloosed (*nissito . . . ittha-bhāvaññatābhāvam saṁsāram nativattati*). *Itthatā* is then the condition characteristic of the world, of being in some given way and not being in some other way: one could not wish for a better definition of "things as they are in themselves."

[1] In A. 1. 148 the same craving is called "unseemly" (*na-paṭirūpam*, literally "informal," i. e. ugly).

[2] For example, being warm, or not being cold. *Abhava* does not imply any privation of existence, but like *saṁkhāya-vimutto*, implies a not being in any determined manner. *Vibhava* (in Pāli) is "privation of existence," but in Sanskrit "omnipresence"; *vibhū* corresponding to *vikrama*, cf. also *vibhūti* as "power." The two meanings are by no means so contrary as might appear; since only that which is not any thing amongst others can be omnipresent.

Uṭṭhāna. Literally "uprising." In M. 1. 354 where it is late at night and the Buddha lies down to sleep in the lion-posture, we have *uṭṭhānaṁ saññam manasikaritvā*, to be rendered by some such phrase as "intent upon the thought of rising (in the morning)." Where the same phrase occurs in Udāna 85 the Buddha has lain down in the same posture on his death bed. In both cases he is fully conscious and aware. In both cases, in so far as he is "some one" by personal and family name, there is a death of one consciousness and the arising of another, in accordance with S. 1. 135 (cited s. v. "Natthika"), yet there is this difference that in our second case, the "uprising" which the Buddha expects is not to be in the body; and this leads us to call attention to the parallel use of *utthāna* in PB. 25. 10. 19-21 where it means the cessation of a ritual operation, and primarily that cessation which is in order when the sacrificers on their counter-current (see "Samudda") journey have reached their goal. Similarly in SB. 4. 6. 9. 7, *sattrotthāna*. Here, of course, *utthāna* as a "standing up" contrasts with *sattra* as sacrificial "session." Now life itself is traditionally a sacrificial session (CU. 3. 17). It is from this session that the Buddha looks forward to a "rising"; he is *not* expecting to "get up again" in the temporal and common sense of the words, but to leave the bodily operation for ever. He will, in fact, enjoy the "final-reward" (*uṭṭhāna-phalam*) of the *ugghaṭitaññu*: *uṭṭhāna* in this context (A. 11. 135) corresponding very closely to the *utthāna* of PB. cited above.

Udda. The PTS Dictionary expresses doubt whether *udda* may not be "beaver" rather than "otter." "Otter" is presumably the etymological equivalent. That *udda* is "otter" is placed beyond doubt by the Dabbhapuppha Jātaka, where *uddā* catch and eat fish; and by the Bharhut relief (CUNNINGHAM, pl. 46, fig. 2), inscribed Uda Jātaka, in which two animals, more like otters than beavers, are represented. Beavers are strict vegetarians and neither catch nor eat fish.

Uddāraka in J. 5. 416 is also "otter."

Uyyoga. Dh. 235-7 is addressed to the man at death's door, for whom the messengers of Yama have come, and who is now come

near to Yama. The words "Thou standest at the door of disjunction (*uyyoga-mukhe*), nor hast thou any provisions-for-the-way" (*pātheyyam*, "fare") are surely reminiscent of KU. 2. 9 where Naciketas stands at Death's (Mṛtyu, Yama) door unfed. *Uyyoga* (*udyoga*) is primarily and literally any severance of connections such as takes place at a departure and so implies departure: thus in DhA. 11. 252 *uyyojesi* is simply "departed" (similarly *udyuj* in SB. 4. 1. 5. 7, and the "Udyoga" Parvan of Mbh.); although more specifically when it is a question of death *udyoga* is the opposite of that *saṁyoga* (BG. 13. 26) by which the Knower of the Field and the Field itself are connected during life. *Udyuga* in AV. 5. 22. 11 may be simply "mortal sickness" in the same sense of "departure";[1] *udyuje* in AV. 6. 70. 2, obscure to Whitney, is simply "walks off with," the sense in full being "As the elephant walks away with its mate, keeping close step" (*padena padam udyuje*), or quite literally "separating (his) foot with her (*hastinyāḥ*) foot," i. e. striding side by side: *udyuj* with *padam* as object corresponding to *chid* in *pādacchida*.

Kalyāṇa. The Dictionary fails to note the very important content, A. 1. 149, in which the "Lovely Self" (*kalyāṇam attānam*) is distinguished from the "foul self" (*pāpam attānam*); a distinction parallel to that of A. 1. 249 between the "Great Self" (*mahattā*) and the "little self" (*appātumo*).

In "Friendship with the Lovely" (*kalyāṇa-mittatā*) and "Lovely Friend" (*kalyāṇa mitto*) I am tempted to see not merely a reference to environment and human relations but at least an ultimate reference to the "Lovely Self" of A. 1. 249, with which "Self" one can also be "unfriendly" (S. 1. 57 *amitten-eva-attanā*, cf. BG. 6. 5-6 *bandhur ātmaiva ripur ātmanaḥ*). Of what other "friendship" could it have been said that "Friendship, companionship, intimacy with the lovely" is not the half, but the whole of Brahmacariya (S. 5. 2), or that such friendship is "a single condition" (*ekadhammam*) whereby the Aryan Eightfold Path can arise, or if arisen can be perfected (S. 5. 37); or what

[1] We speak of a dying man as "nearly gone" or in slang as a "goner."

other "lovely friend" could have been described as the chief external factor in the development of the seven "limbs of wisdom" (S. 5. 101-102)?

It is certainly also the *kalyāṇattā, mahattā*—not the *pāpattā, appātumo*—that is meant by *attā* in S. 1. 75 (= Udāna 47) which following BU. 2. 4, 4. 5 and 4. 3. 21 (*ātmakāma*), praises the *atta-kāmo*, a term that can be rendered by "self-lover" only if it be understood that all that "is not myself" (*na me so attā*) has been excluded. It is in this sense also that "a man, out of charity, ought to love himself more than he loves any other person . . . more than his neighbour" (St. THOMAS AQUINAS, *Sum. Theol.* 2-2. 26. 4); and similarly HERMES, *Lib.* 4. 6 b, "love thyself, if thou wouldst have wisdom," cf. ARISTOTLE, *Eth. Nic.* 9. 8 on the two meanings of "self-love." As SCOTT (*Hermetica*, 2. 145) remarks "The man whom the Hermetist describes as 'loving himself' corresponds to Aristotle's σπουδαῖος, who . . . shows himself to be φίλαυτος in the sense that he seeks τὸ καλόν (= *kalyāṇam*) for himself . . . (and) develops that which is best and highest in himself by religious meditation" (i. e. *jhāna*).

Kāmakāra. "To do what one will does not pertain to the common herd" (*na kāmakāro hi putthujjanānam*, Sn. 350). This denial of free will to the natural man is paralleled in S. 3. 66-67 where the proposition, that body, feeling, willing, etc. are *anattā*, not I, nor mine, nor myself (*na me so attā*), is proved by the consideration that were they myself or mine I should be able to say "Let by body (or feeling, willing, etc.) be thus, or not thus," and it would be so, since nothing can be called I or mine absolutely unless I have full power over it. Sn. 350 implies, of course, that a Tathāgata is *kāmakāro*, can do what he will; and that this is so is elsewhere made explicit in the lists of *iddhis*, beginning with the formula *aham bhikkhave yāvadeva ākaṅkhāmi*, "I, almsmen, whatever I will . . . ," S. 2. 212 etc. The word does not occur in Brahmanical texts before the Epics, but is the same in effect as *kāmācārin*, "Mover-at-will" recognizable in RV. 9. 113. 9 *anukāmaṁ caraṇam*, and thereafter throughout the literature, e. g. JUB. 3. 28. 3, CU. 8. 5. 4, TU. 3. 5.

Kūṭa (as a weapon). *Kūṭa* in Mil. 38 is not so much the ridge-pole of a house but rather synonymous with its roof-plate (*kaṇṇikā*) to which all the rafters converge. This roof-plate, as we have often shown, represents in the cosmic architectural symbolism for which we have so many data in Indian literature, the Sun; and in microcosmic symbolism the *brahma-randhra*, or scapular foramen whence the spirit departs when the dying man "gives up the ghost."[1] *Kūṭa* is then, like *kaṇṇikā*, a likeness of the Sun, and it may be assumed that like the *kaṇṇikā*, the *kūṭa* may be a perforated form. We understand accordingly that when the Yakkha of J. 1. 146 "holds a metal *kūṭa*, a mighty sun, of the size of a roof-plate" (*kaṇṇika-mattam mahantam āditttam ayakūṭaṁ gahetvā*) he is wielding what may be a discus, but is more probably a mace in the familiar shape of a discoid head and provided with a handle passing through its central opening, just as the Axis Mundi passes through the Sundoor and as the central axis of a house or smoke from the central hearth passes through the eye of its dome, or luffer. The same is to be understood in JB. 1. 49.9, where a Season, an agent of the Sun, is represented as descending on a ray of light, "armed with a mace" (*kūṭa-hastaḥ*); and in SB. 3. 8. 1. 15 where "they do not strike the victim with a mace" (*na kūṭena praghnanti*).[2] On the other hand, in JB. 1.

[1] For further references and detailed analysis see my "Symbolism of the Dome" in *IHQ* 14, 1938 and "Svayamātṛṇṇā: Janua Coeli" to appear immediately in *Zalmoxis*. In connection with the "Symbolism of the Dome," in which I identified the Ṛbhus with the three dimensions of space, I should like to add that this interpretation is virtually proved by 4. 33. 5 where, of the three brothers, the eldest proposes to make of Tvaṣṭṛ's vessel two, the second three, and the youngest four (one dimension makes of a single point *two* points separated by a line, a second creates a plane or field of *tri*angulation, a third creates a real space that can be thought of as *four*-cornered). I ought not, however, to have said that Tvaṣṭṛ misliked what had been done: on the contrary he approves (*panayat*, Sāyaṇa *astaut, aṅgicakāra*) and likes (*avenat*, Sāyaṇa *akāmayat, aṅgīcakāra*) the fourfold arrangement. If the Ṛbhus are also the best friends of the solar Indra, it is likewise because in the beginning he is desirous of a space within which he and his followers may fulfil their purposes.

[2] Eggeling mistranslates as though the reading had been *kūṭe*. Sāyana's comment, "siezing it by the horn" does not support Eggeling's nor does it conflict with our own interpretation: one holds the victim by the horn in order to strike it with the mace.

In Oertel's discussion of *kūṭa* (*JAOS* 19.114) he renders by "hammer," quite satisfactorily in the SB. context and JB. 1. 49. 9, and only finds *kūṭe* in JB. 1. 49. 2

49.2 where "one should strike the victim on the *kūṭa*" (*kūṭe hanyāt*), it is the top of the head that is referred to, in accordance with microcosmic analogy mentioned above.

Gadha (for **gaḍha**?). In S. 5. 41 the factors of the Eightfold Path are said to "plunge into the Deathless" (*amato-gadha*), have their beyond in the Deathless (*amato-parāyana*), to have their last-end in the Deathless (*amato-pariyosāna*). The Dictionary does not have *gadha* (from Skr. *gāh*, to dive or plunge into) and treats *amatogadha* here and elsewhere as *amat'ogadha*, i. e. *-avagāḍha*: but the analogy of the other words seems to make a reading *-gadha* preferable. In any case, the metaphor is closely related to that of rivers reaching the Sea = Nibbāna (see "Samudda"): and corresponds to ECKHART's "Plunge in: this is the drowning" ("in the bottomless sea of the Godhead"). The distinction of a drowning in the Upper Waters from a drowning in the Nether Waters is, of course, well-known; the latter corresponds to the shipwreck en route in S. 4. 179-180.

Gavakkha. Not in PTS Dictionary. In EA. 3. 195 I supposed that no reference for a Pāli *gavakkha*, corresponding to Skr. *gavākṣa* and Prakrit *gavekkha*, "bull's-eye window," could be cited. The word occurs, however, in Mhv. 9. 15, 17.

difficult because he forgets that *kūṭa* is the head or top of anything, cf. DhA. 3. 216-7 where *kūṭa*, *matthaka* and *muddhan* all refer to the "top" of a mountain. *Kūṭa*, from *kuṭ*, to be bent or curved, is peak or top because the top of anything such as a mountain, house or skull is either an angle or a dome, just as *kuṭi* or *kuṭī* as "cottage" is evidently so called because of its pointed or bent roof (*kuṭaṅka*): as the peak of the roof, *kūṭa* coincides with *kaṇṇikā*: and becomes a mace or hammer by analogy because the top of the roof, the aforesaid roof-plate, is actually a perforated disc through which the axis of the house passes (as the Axis Mundi passes through the Sun), the handle of the hammer corresponding to this axis. It follows, in the last analysis, that the mace or hammer as a weapon "derives," like other weapons, from the primordial *vajra*. The mace or hammer is appropriately held by the "Season" of JB. 1. 49. 9 because the Seasons are the "doorkeepers" of the Sun, *ib.* 1. 18. 2. It is in the same way that Indra's *vajra* becomes a *hammer* in the hands of Thor.

In connection with equation *kūṭa* = *kaṇṇikā* it may be remarked that the meanings of *kaṇṇikā* as "earring" and "pericarp of a lotus" are secondary, the primary sense, depending on the etymological connection of *karṇa* with *śṛṅga* and *aśri* (and Ger. Ecke), being that of "projection" or "corner" (as in J. 6. 330). Both *kūṭa* and *kaṇṇikā* are, then, as "point" of the roof, equivalents of *angulus* and γωνία, "cornerstone" as interpreted in my "Eckstein" in *Speculum*, Jan. 1939.

Cetiya. The PTS Dictionary omits to mention that *cetiya* is by no means necessarily a *thūpa*, but in fact more often a sacred tree. The definition of the three classes of *cetiyas* in the Kālingabodhi Jātaka (J. 4. 228) should have been cited. Cf. my *Elements of Buddhist Iconography* and "Nature of Buddhist Art"; B. C. LAW, "Cetiya in the Buddhist literature" in *Studia Indo-Iranica*, 1931, pp. 42-48; and V. R. R. DIKSHITA, "The origin and early history of caityas" in *IHQ* 14, 1938, pp. 440-451. The suggestion that root *cit*, to consider, as well as root *ci*, to build up, enters into the meaning of the word *caitya, cetiya*, has been made independently by DIKSHITA and myself, on the basis of such texts as RV. 6. 1. 5 where Agni is *cetyaḥ* (from *cit*), and SB. 6. 2. 3. 9 where the courses of the Fire-Altar are "*citayaḥ*" (from *ci*) because they were foreknown in accordance with the injunction "*cetayadhvam*" (from *cit*) and the fact that it was *cetayamānā* (from *cit*) that the builders foreknew the courses, and because the *cetiya* is not always in fact a thing "built up," but is always a support of contemplation (*caitya*, as if from *cit*).

Jhāna, samādhi. *Jhāna* is always "contemplation," *jhāyin* (like *dhīra*) always "contemplative." Mrs. RHYS DAVIDS' and F. L. WOODWARD'S usual rendering by "musing" or "quiet musing" enormously weakens the proper values of these terms.[1] Even less appropriate (and it may be added, rather "early Victorian") is Lord CHALMERS' rendering of *jhāyino* by "those who woo Reverie" and of *jhāyī* by "Reverie" (Sn. 719, 638). Contemplation, a word of precise meaning in the corresponding European contexts, is anything but "day dreaming." *Jhāna* tends towards and reaches its end in *samādhi*.[2]

[1] It is regrettable that Mrs. RHYS DAVIDS has not consistently maintained the position so well expressed in *Kindred Sayings*, 1. 68, note 2, where she explains *bhāvana* as "constructive work (in contemplation, of course . . . contemplation means both elimination . . . and . . . creation)." I am appalled by Mrs. RHYS DAVIDS' "Dhyāna was not meditation; it was the making attention a *tabula rasa* for psychic communication. It was the later monk who converted this into mental hypnosis," etc. (*NIA* 2. 46, April 1939).

[2] In S. 1. 48 a Deva suggests that "He is wake who 'awakens' contemplation" (*yo jhānam abuddhi buddho*); the Buddha assents, with the reservation "Yes, if they be perfectly synthesized, or unified" (*sammā te susamāhitā*).

Samādhi is etymologically and quite literally "synthesis" and is generally best translated thus in both Buddhist and Sanskrit contexts: *dharaṇa, dhyāna* and *samādhi* corresponding to the *consideratio, contemplatio* and *excessus* or *raptus* of RICHARD OF ST. VICTOR and other Christian contemplatives; *excessus* and *raptus* imply in the one case a "going out of oneself" and a being "taken out of oneself" and in either case a consequent "being in the spirit" and thus one's real "Self," but of these two terms the latter is unsuited to the Indian contexts, *yoga* being an "active" rather than a "passive" or "mystic" discipline.

In *samādhi* there is no longer any object of contemplation; in *avitakka samādhi* one is what one knows; one knows indeed, but it is not a second thing, other than oneself that one knows; there is *adaequatio rei et intellectus*, as *in divinis*.[3] The synthetic values implied in the common expression *ajjhataṁ* (*adhyātmam*) *susamāhito*, "completely Self-centred,"[4] are clearly brought out in Mil. 38 (and corresponding AA. 3. 2. 1) where all the powers of the soul (the *kusalā dhammā*) are referred to as converging to one point, in which they are unified, just as the rafters of a dome converge towards and are at-oned in the roof-plate. It is upon *jhāna* and *samādhi* that the possession of *iddhis*, which are strictly speaking "powers" of the Spirit and not of the individual self, altogether depends.

Tathāgata. In support of the view that the reference of this word is to the Buddha's advent (cf. my note in *BSOS* 9) may be cited A. 2. 23 where the Buddha is "Tathāgata" by virtue of his omniscience, infallibility, and because "as he teaches, so he does" (*yathā vādī . . . tathā kārī*, as also in Sn. 357): in Sn. 340 and It. 430 the Buddha is *tathā-vādī*. *Tathā-kāri* and *tathā-vādi* are

[3] A. 5. 7 where in *avitakka samādhi* the Comprehensor is not aware of anything, and yet not without awareness (*asaññī*). This is the position so fully stated in BU. 4. 3; although, curiously enough, D. 3. 127 pours contempt on the saying *passaṁ na passati*, the very words of BU. 4. 3. 23 *na paśyati paśyan*. D. 3. 127 is a bad example of the tendency of the Pāli texts to pervert the meanings of Sanskrit logoi in order to gain the victory over a straw man.

[4] In the sense the "God is in all things self-intent," "sees only himself," and that the divine manner of knowing is "not by means of any object external to the knower."

parallel to *tathāgata*; *tathāgata* then, from this point of view would be "He who came thus saying and thus doing." Sn. 957 has *buddham . . . tādim . . . āgatam*, "Buddha come hither in such a fashion." S. 4. 195 *yathāmaggo* = Ariyan Eightfold Path is suggestive. DhA. 3. 226 *tusitā . . . āgato* is another sense in which he is "thus-come." *Lalita Vistara* Ch. 26 (Lefmann p. 423) has *dharmacakram pravartitam, yasya pravartanāt, tathāgata ity ucyate*, "It is because of his turning of the Wheel of the Law (or Principial Wheel) that he is called 'Tathāgata'"; and this is confirmatory of the *tathā-vādī tathā-kārī* explanation, since it is precisely the Dhamma that he teaches and the Dhamma that he "does." The text is no doubt an echo of D. 3. 135 (= A. 11. 23) where all that the Buddha has said, from the time of his Awakening to that of his Decease, "all that is just so and not otherwise, and therefore is he called Tathāgata. For, O Cunda, what the Tathāgata said, he does, and what he does is what he says" (*sabbaṁ taṁ tath'eva hoti, no aññathā. Tasmā tathāgato'ti vuccati. Yathāvādī, Cunda, tathākārī, yathākārī tathāvādī*).[1] So much for *tathā*. *Āgata* occurs so often in connection with the Buddha's coming, as to make the word-division *tathā-gata* very implausible; that *āgata* is likewise often found in connection with Agni affords additional evidence (*āgamana* is precisely "advent"). The *Tathāgata* is the "Thus-come" with reference to any or all of the "ways" of his coming, but especially with reference to his advent as one who "practised what he preached." Cf. *sāgatam* (*su-āgatam*), "Welcome," in *sāgatam bhante bhagavato*, D. I. 179 = M. 1. 481; not to be confused with *sugata*, "well-faring" or "well-fared," a common epithet of the Buddha.

Tejanam. I have long had in mind to compile a vocabulary of the Sanskrit and Pāli terminology of archery. The two most difficult words are *kulmala* and *tejana*. Pāli contexts make the mean-

[1] The concept is Vedic, cf. RV. 4. 33. 6 where (with reference to the Ṛbhus) *satyam ūcur nara evā hi cakruḥ*. The perfect correspondence of thought, word and act is the Tathāgata's integrity.

The Buddhist "Go thou and do likewise" may be cited from J. 2. 130, "Those who do what the Buddha has enjoined, follow the path of fortune" (*ye ca kāhanti . . . buddhena desitaṁ, soṭṭhim pāraṁ gamissanti = nibbānaṁ gacchanti*).

ing of the latter word sufficiently clear. The PTS Dictionary emphasizes the sense of *tij* "to be sharp" and makes *tejanam* the point or shaft of an arrow or the arrow itself: we shall see, however, that it is always a "heating" that is directly referred to and a "straightening" that is implied. We first consider the Sanskrit contexts. *Tejanam* is a factor in the make up of an arrow, but not any concrete part of the arrow. In RV. 9. 111. 22 the fletcher (here simply *karmāra*, "wright") plys his trade equipped with "dry reeds, feathers of birds, stones,[1] and fire" *dyubhiḥ*, i. e. literally "with flames," and as Sāyaṇa comments *tejanārthābhiḥ*, "for the purpose of heating," hence as in RV. 1. 53. 4 etc., and in GRASSMANN's sense 15 for *div*). These four requisites correspond to the four factors of an arrow in AB. I. 25 where Soma is the shaft (*śalya*), Varuṇa the feathers, Agni the point (*anīka*) and Viṣṇu the *tejanam* (as he is also in TS. 6. 2. 3. 1).[2] In AB. 3. 26 where the arrow is resolved into its equivalents, the *tejanam* becomes the blindworm (*andhāhi*). AV. 6. 57. 1 is a protection from the arrow "of a single firing and a hundred shafts" (*ekatejanāṁ śataśalyām*) by which we understand a flight of however many arrows proceeding from any one source (as many rays proceed from one sun), and more especially a protection from sunstroke. In AV. 6. 49. 1 where "The ape devours the *tejanam*" (whatever may be meant) there is not necessarily any reference to an arrow.[3] In AV. 5. 18. 8 the teeth are metaphorically arrows and are *tapasābhidigdhāḥ*, literally "well smeared by heat-

[1] Taken together, reference to stone arrow-heads here, and to arrow-heads of bronze in RV. 6. 75. 15, implies a "chalcolithic" culture.

[2] In SB. 3. 4. 4. 14-15, where it is a question of the making of the *vajra* (incidentally, the archetypal weapon, from which the sword, hammer or mace, and arrow are all "derived"), Viṣṇu is (1) *kulmala* and (2) that which lies "between" Agni and Soma as between day and night. Without discussing *kulmala* at length, I will only say that the equation *kulmala* = *sandhi* implied here agrees with the meaning of "fastening" (of point to shaft) which I find for *kulmala* as a factor in the make-up of an arrow, and with the gloss on AV. 3. 24. 2, rendered by Keith "thing to fasten (*saṁśleṣa-*) tip to shaft," . . . not, however, "like a ferrule," but either a cement or glue, or as in AB. 3. 26 a binding with "sinews" (*snāvānī*), as also in M. 1. 429 *nahāru*.

[3] (Vṛṣā-) kapi, perhaps a prototype of Hanuman, hence = Vāyu, into whom the Fire (and all other "half-deities") returns when it goes out, being thus swallowed up.

ing," and *ib.* 15 *iṣur iva digdhā . . . sā brāhmaṇasyeṣur ghorā*, " and like the arrow smeared, so is that arrow of the Brahman terrible." It has generally been presumed that *digdha* in this and similar contexts (BrD. 5. 133, explaining RV. 6. 75. 15 *ālākta . . . iṣvai*; SB. 14. 9. 4. 8; R. 2. 30. 23 etc.) means " smeared with poison," and this is no doubt correct in some cases; in M. 1. 429 *sallena . . . savisena gāḷhapalepanena* is certainly " with an arrow heavily smeared with poison," but it will be seen that there are other ways and for other reasons that an arrow can be " smeared."

We can now take up the Pāli contexts. In M. 2. 105 and Dh. 80 and 145 " Irrigators lead the water, fletchers straighten their shafts (*usukārā namayanti tejanam*), carpenters shape (*namayanti*) the wood, the learned train themselves (*attānaṁ damayanti paṇḍitā*)." It will be observed that *nam* is not here literally to " bend," but to " sway " in the sense of " control " or " manage," and give the proper form to any material.[4] " Fletchers straighten their shafts " is a legitimate but not a literal translation of what is really " Fletchers control their fire "; and this is in some respects a better rendering from the Buddhist point of view, according to which it is precisely by the proper control of the fire of life that the " self " is rectified. What is important in the present connection, however, is the connection of a word implying heat with a metaphor that has all to do with a putting straight, an ordering of things in the way they should go, that is to say straight to their end.

We can now conclude with the text of J. 1. 66 and the corresponding representation of the fletcher at work, at Bharhut (CUNNINGHAM, pl. 44, fig. 2). The " moral " is one of single-mindedness; the fletcher sees better with one eye closed, sighting along the arrow to see whether it is straight, and disregarding what might be simultaneously seen by the other eye, were it open. The text reads, *tasmin samaye usukāro aṅgārapalle usuṁ tāpetvā kañjikena temetvā ekaṁ aksiṁ nimīlitvā eken'olokento ujuṁ karoti*, " Just then a fletcher, heating an arrow over a fire-pan, and

[4] *Nam* is found already in AV. 3. 25. 2 where *śalyām . . . tāṁ susaṁnatām kṛtvā* is rendered by KEITH " having made that arrow well-straightened."

moistening it with paste, had one eye closed and looking with the other was straightening the arrow." It should now be clear how it is that a heating (*tejanam* or *tapas*) is essential to the make-up of an arrow, but not a concrete part of an arrow. It appears also that an arrow may be smeared with a view to temporary softening and not with poison: the expression *tapasābhidigdhā* and *digdhā* in AV. 5. 18. 8, 15 imply then rather a straightening than a poisoning of the Brahman's verbal shafts, which are "terrible," not as being venomous, but inasmuch as they fly "straight to the point." There is no evidence that *tejanam* ever refers to the sharpening of an arrow.[5] It is often possible to render *tejanam* literally by "heat" or "fire." A rendering by shaft or arrow is possible if we assume the series of associated ideas, heat straightening, straight, and straight-going (*ṛjīta*, RV. 6. 75. 12; *ṛju-ga*, cited from a Lexikon as a kenning for "arrow"): it is, in fact, in this way that in RV. 1. 110. 5 *tejanena* (in spite of SĀYAṆA's *tīkṣaṇena śastreṇa*) must mean "with a (straight) rod," a rod compared to an arrow or "shaft" of light, *mamus tejanena* here corresponding to *raśminā . . . mame* in RV. 8. 25. 18; that *tejanam* in AV. 1. 2. 4 (where it is the Axis Mundi, *diva-skambha*) is "fiery *pillar*"; and the *tejanam* in M. 2. 105 = *śalyām*, "arrow," in AV. 3. 25. 2, as can be clearly seen from the use of root *nam* in both contexts.

Thūpa. The original meaning of *stūpa*, top, peak, head, dome etc. may be noted in D. 3. 117, where Nāthaputta having died, the Niganṭha doctrine and discipline are "broken-headed and without protection" (*bhinna-thūpe appaṭisaraṇe*). In J. 6. 117 and Mhv. 31. 13 *pañca-thūpa* and *pañca-thūpika* are "five-domed" (palaces). None of these references as given in the Dictionary, which knows of *thūpa* only as "tomb" and "tope" (*dhātu-gabbha*). The Buddhist tomb is *dhātu-gabbha* by function and *thūpa* by its domed form, which corresponds to that of the cranium.

[5] An arrow is "whetted" literally or metaphorically by an incantation (*brahma-saṁśitā*, RV. 6. 75. 16) or by "worship" (*upāsanisitam*, Mund. Up. 2. 2. 4); just a sword is "whetted" by an invocation of the Gale, SB. 1. 2. 4. 5-7.

Dikkhita. The purpose of the present article is to enquire whether or not the regular Buddhist ordination can be equated with initiation (*dīkṣā*).[1] The root occurs in Pāli only very rarely, in *dikkhita* = *dīkṣita*. In the *Saṁyutta Nikāya* 1.226 a prophet (*isi* = *ṛṣi*; the word is also used of the Buddha and of Buddhist monks) is *cira-dikkhita*, "long initiated," explained by the Commentator as *cira-pabbājita*,[2] "long ordained as a Pilgrim." *Cira-pabbājita* contrasts, of course, with *navo acira-pabbājita*, "recently ordained a Pilgrim," in other contexts, both terms being of common occurrence. In *Jātaka* 5.138-9 we find *cira-dakkhita* referring to "prophets" (*isayo*) in the following of the Bodhisattva Sarabhanga-Jotipāla, who is unquestionably a solar principle; and this spelling is of interest because it preserves the form of the root *dakṣ*, "to be able," the basic value of *dīkṣita*, "initiated," being precisely "enabled."

Taking now for granted the reader's knowledge of the significance of initiation in India and elsewhere,[3] we shall argue that *pabbajita* has really the value *dīkṣita*, and a fortiori that *upasampadā* has that of a more advanced initiation. The first ordinations were necessarily made by the Buddha himself, who used the significant words "Come, medicant-monk" (*ehi-bhikkhu*), reminiscent of the welcome, "Come" (*ehi*) addressed by the Sun to the would-be entrant who has rightly answered the question "Who art thou?" (*Jaiminīya Upaniṣad Brāhmaṇa*, 3.14.5,

[1] It should be needless to say that "ordination" as such must be distinguished from "initiation" as such: the former, however significant, is merely the conferring of a specific "character" and comparable to the imposition of a new "form" on already "formed" material; the latter is always a second birth, the birth of another and new man, not a *re*formation of but a *trans*formation of the man that was before. It does not follow that what has been called an ordination (in translation) may not in fact have been an initiation. In any case the Buddhist ordination is not the imposition of a "priestly" character; the monk is not a "priest." For a discussion of Buddhist ordination see *Psalms of the Brethren*, index, s.v.

[2] The root meaning of *pabbajati* is to "go forth," "go into exile," and of the causative *pabbājati*, to "be exiled" or "banished," hence technically to abandon the indoor and household life and adopt that of the "unroofed" Pilgrim. The Pilgrim carries his own roof (umbrella) about with himself.

[3] See the comprehensive series of articles on "Initiation" published by M. René Guénon in recent volumes of *Études traditionelles*. We hope to publish on some future occasion some of the principal Indian texts in which the subject is treated.

cf. Rūmī, *Mathnawī*, 1.3602-3). If designations such as "Kinsman of the Sun" (*ādicca-bandhu*) are to be taken literally, as they must be for all those who are not misled by the "historical" form of the "Buddha-legend," this is sufficient to show that such ordinations were really initiations and invitations, in the etymological senses of the words: the historical Buddha is surely an euhemerisation of the Vedic Agni,[3a] who is likewise "awakened" at dawn (*uṣar-budh*) and is the "deity of the initiate" (*agni vai dīkṣitasya devatā, Taittirīya Saṁhitā*, 3.1.3). Nor is anything changed in principle by the delegation of the power of ordination or initiation to others (who are constantly referred to as "Sons of the Buddha," e. g. S. 1. 192), such a transmission being equally necessary and regular in the most unquestionably orthodox conditions, and indeed inevitable if there is to be a transmission of a veritable gnosis from generation to generation.

The original ordinations had conferred *pabbajā* (the status of "Pilgrim") and *upasampadā* ("Full Attainment," and almost literally the state of being an "Adept") simultaneously. After the delegation of power we find that both are still conferred together, but by a quorum of the mendicant-monks, upon those who having been tonsured and robed, repeated thrice the formula of "Taking Refuge." We find then that *upasampadā* can only be conferred on the recommendation of a teacher, upon some younger monk who has come to him as a pupil. The teacher is called *upajjhāya*, literally "one who is gone up near to," the pupil a *saddhivihārika*, literally "associate resident," i. e. who lives with the teacher in daily intimacy. The relation is formally paternal; the pupil renders the teacher personal service. Before a teacher can receive another monk as pupil, he must himself have been fully ordained, must have been an "Adept," for at least ten years. Under these conditions he may, when he sees fit, propose the pupil as a candidate for *upasampadā* to the monastic assembly; the pupil, for his part, formally requesting the assembly to "extract

[3a] Cf. SÉNART, *La légende du Bouddha*, 1875, p. 425: "(le) trône du Bouddha substitué à l'ancien autel brahmanique; (le Bouddha) perpétue sous une forme nouvelle la présence du feu sacré."

me" (*ullumpatu*[4] *mam*), suggestive of the Brāhmaṇa formula "as a snake (*ahi*) might be freed from (*nirmucyeta*) its slough, or as one might draw (*vivṛhet*) an arrow from a reed (*muñjāt*), so is he liberated (*nirmucyate*) from all evil" (*Jaiminīya Brāhmaṇa*, 2.134, etc.).[5] A monk thus fully ordained or initiated might after ten years himself receive pupils. The succession of such Vinaya teachers from Upali to Mahinda is given in the *Dīpavaṁsa*. All this has the appearance of the regular system of transmission from spiritual father to spiritual son (*guru-paramparā*) in generation after generation, but with a specific adaptation to the more communal character of the Buddhist order of "Pilgrims" (*pabbājaka*), who from the earliest times were thought of as a "Congregation" (*saṁgha*) rather than as solitaries.

There are also internal evidences. Ordination involved the abandonment of one's own and of one's family name (*nāma-gotta*)—"just as when rivers reach the sea, they abandon their name and descent (*pajahanti nāma-gottāni*) . . .," the Pilgrim now becoming a "Son of Buddha" (*sakya-putto*, Udāna 55).

[4] The *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, 3.1.4.1 describes *dīkṣā* as an *audgrabhaṇa* or "lifting up" (from this world to that of the gods), and it is to this expression that the Buddhist designation of ordination as an *ullumpana* seems to correspond. M. A. Préau calls my attention to the fourteenth stanza of the *Paramārtha-sāra* of Abhinavagupta, where it is said that it is the function of the mantras, "by their conducive nature (*anugraha-svabhāvāt*) to extricate animal-men" (*paśūn uddhartum*).

[5] This well-known series of similes recurs in *Majjhima Nikāya* 2.17 (and *Dīgha Nikāya* 1,77, cf. 1.34), "I have shown my disciples the means (*paṭipannā*, with reference to contemplative practices already listed) whereby they can create (*abhinimminanti, abhi-* implying a super- or transformation, where the simple *nimminanti* would mean only a formation) out of this body (the aforesaid *kāyo rūpī cātummahābhūtiko*, the formal body based on the four elements) another formal body of intellectual substance (*aññaṁ kāyam . . . rūpim manomayam* = D.1.34 *aññο attā dibbo rūpī manomayo*), complete with all its limbs and members, and with transcendental faculties (*abhi-n-indriyam*, but in D.1.34 and 1.77 *ahīnindriyo*, not deprived of any faculty). It is just as if a man should draw out (*pabbāheyya* = *pravṛhet*) an arrow (*isīkam*) from a reed (*muñjaṁhā*), or a sword from its scabbard, or a snake (*ahim*) from its slough. He is aware that arrow and reed are two different things, that sword and scabbard are different things, that snake and slough are different things; he is aware that the arrow is just what has been extracted from (*pabbāḷhoprabṛdha*) the reed, etc." With this body of intellectual substance he enjoys omniscience (*abhiññā*) and is a Mover-at-will as far as the Brahma-heavens (*yāva brahmalokā pi kāyena vasaṁ vattenti*). ~~This is the answer to the question asked in *Sutta Nipāta* 508 *ken'attanā gacchati brahmalokam*, "By what 'self' does one reach the Brahma heavens?"~~

Ordination is, in fact, a second birth: we find together with *yato jāto*, " from the time I was born " such expressions as *yato ariyayā jatiyā jāto*, " from the time I was born of the Ariyan kin " (*Majjhima Nikāya*, 2. 103), i. e. as a *sakya-putto*, a " Buddha-son," and even more explicit the passage in which Kassapa speaks of his perfect mastery and calls himself a " Natural son of the Blessed One, born of his mouth, born of the Dhamma, fashioned by the Dhamma, and an heir of the Dhamma (*Saṁyutta Nikāya*, 2. 221).[6]

Nor is it by any means anyone or everyone that can be ordained. As an example of intellectual qualification there can be cited the case of the " Long-haired Fire-men " (*aggikā jaṭilā*, i. e.

[6] In the Agañña Sutta (D. 3. 84) where these formulae recur, it is explained that they are applicable only to those whose faith (*saddhā*) in the Buddha is settled, radical, well-grounded, and such that they cannot be robbed of it. The Sutta as a whole is an admirable description of the Fall and Regeneration of man, though at D. 3. 81-2 it affords a good example of the childish level to which the Pāli texts can descend for controversial purposes; here the Brahman claim to be " Natural sons of Brahmā, born of his mouth, etc." is ridiculed, and refuted (!) by the argument that Brahmans like other men are visibly born of woman, despite the identification of Buddha with Brahmā (or Brahman) at 3. 84. The intention of the Pāli text is evidently to distinguish the Brahman by human birth from the Brahma = Arahat who becomes a son of God by adoption; but in order to make this distinction the real significance of RV. 10. 90 is perverted. Equally childish is the argument of the Tevijja Sutta (D. 1. 235 f.) that the Vedas are futile, because of the different " paths " that are taught in their schools; the Brahman protagonist rightly maintains that all alike are straight roads to Brahmā (i. e. Prajāpatī), but the Buddha is made to say that this is ridiculous, because the Brahmans themselves do not claim to have seen Brahmā or to know where he is—an argument of really astonishing puerility. In the same way *Saṁyutta Nikāya* 1. 61-62 where it is well said that " World's end is within you," but it is pretended that the Rohita of *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* 7. 15 did not know this and had thought that World's End could be reached by an actual locomotion. Or again *Dīgha Nikāya* 3. 127 where the meaning of *passaṁ na passati* (= *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Up.*, 4. 3. 23 *na paśyati paśyan vai*) is distorted. Passages such as these show clearly enough that the Pāli canon includes much that is of purely human, and all-too-human origin. It is in spite of such passages that a fairly thorough study of the Pāli texts has led us to believe that the early Buddhist *dhamma* is essentially orthodox and only superficially heterodox. We believe that the Buddha meant what he said when he affirmed that he " had found the ancient path and followed it " (*Saṁyutta Nikāya*, 2. 106, reflecting *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* Up. 4. 4. 8), viz. that " ancient " (path) which the Brahmans of old are said to have remembered (*Saṁyutta Nikāya*, 4. 117) but which others have forgotten (*Dīgha Nikāya* 3. 81-82), the " primordial walk with Brahman " of *Dīgha Nikāya* 3. 40. We believe that the Buddha came " not to destroy but to fulfil the law."

Brahman ascetics whose deity was Agni) who could be given *upasampadā* immediately, without the usual four month's probation (*parivāsa*) because they were already *kammavādino* and *kiriyavādino*,[7] i.e. believed in the "causal origination" of all phenomena whatever, and at the same time that there is an "ought to be done," to be contrasted with an "ought not to be done," or "savoir-faire" to be contrasted with a "laissez-faire" (the opposites of these positions are well known "heresies" from the Buddhist point of view). We need not cite here from the *Cullavagga* the long list of disqualifications, but only say that these may be either moral, intellectual or physical, the physical disqualifications including a great variety of deformities and diseases.[8]

Where, as in Burma, it is the rule for everyone to become a monk for a limited time, or when a Buddhist king is temporarily ordained,[9] it would appear that this temporary retreat from the

[7] The opposites of these positions are well-known "heresies" (*miccā-diṭṭhi*) from the Buddhist point of view, as they must be from that of any orthodox teaching. Expressed in Christian terms, *kammavāda* is the doctrine that all "accidents" are causally originated, nothing whatever happening by chance or because of any direct divine intervention; *kiriyavāda* that there is an "ought-to-be-done" and an "ought-not-to-be-done" (*akiriya*). It should be noted, however, that *akiriyavāda* as a heretical doctrine implies that there is "not-an-ought-to-be-done" and corresponds to the "amoralism" with which the Amaurians were charged in the Middle Ages. In the same connection it should be observed that while the moral values are, if anything, over-emphasized in Buddhism (a fact closely connected with its especially Kṣatriya character), it is not pretended that right conduct is of more than a necessary dispositive value in relation to the final attainment: as is clearly shown in the Parable of the Raft (*Majjhima Nikāya*, 1. 135) where conduct is a "boat" to be abandoned when the "Farther Shore" has been reached, and in *Dhammapada* 267 where those who have rejected virtue and vice alike (*yo ca puññañ ca pāpaṁ bāhetvā*) can rightly be called "walkers with God in this world" and "mendicant-monks."

[8] *Nāgas* (serpents of partly human character but retaining ophidian characteristics) are disqualified, even though they may be moved by the best intentions. To this corresponds the "folk-lore" principle, that mermaids cannot as such acquire a "soul," but must be "married" to a human being, at the same time losing their scaly tails, which are changed into feet, so that no trace of their ophidian origin remains. In reality, of course, it is always a Solar Hero that "marries" the mermaid (*nāginī*), and to this situation (that of Apālā in relation to Indra) can be applied the words of Donne, "Nor ever chaste unless Thou ravish me."

[9] For the cases of Asoka and of the Chinese Emperor Wu-ti, both of whom took orders without effective abdication see Vincent SMITH, *Early History of India*, 1924, p. 168.

world corresponds exactly to that of the Vedic Sacrificer (*yajamāna*)[10] who devotes *himself* and, being initiated (*dīkṣita*), is during the operation no longer himself, no longer "this man," un tel, until when the operation is relinquished he returns to himself, from the Truth to the Falsehood, and becomes once more "who he really is" in the worldly sense, So-and-so by name and lineage.

Buddhist ordination, we conclude, has not only the appearance but also the significance of an initiation. The only possible alternative would be to regard it as a pseudo- or even counter-initiation. The latter alternative is manifestly out of the question: [11] nor can the former be entertained by anyone who accepts the texts in their entirety, in which the Buddha is described as more than man and as of Agni's and solar lineage.

Natthika. Literally a "There-is-not-ist," or a little more freely "Nothing-morist," the term is used in Sanskrit and Pāli alike to mean approximately what is meant by our "skeptic," "materialist," "pragmatist," or "atheist." The man who maintains "There is no other world" (*natthi paro loko*)[a] despite the fact

[10] In this connection it is worthy of note that *yajamāna* is a form that may be either reflexive or passive, and thus means both "Sacrificer" and "Sacrificed." That the Sacrificer who is also a Comprehensor of the ritual is really a "sacrificer of himself" (*ātma-yajñī*) is repeatedly affirmed (e.g. *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* 10.2.6.13-14), and this is also true of the Christian sacrifice (the Mass).

[11] The Purāṇas in which the Buddha is reckoned an *avatar* of Viṣṇu consider that he was born as a deceiver in order to lead astray the enemies of the Devas. We are more inclined to think that (as in Mark 4. 11-12) the Buddhist *dhamma* is presented in a form that could easily be misunderstood (cf. for example *Dīgha Nikāya* 3.40 where it is described as "hard to be understood by you who are of different views, another tolerance, other tastes, other allegiance and other training"), and that it could have enlightened some ("to whom it is given to know the mystery of the kingdom of God") and deluded others ("them that are without, lest at any time they be converted, and their sins should be forgiven them"). I have known a modern scholar to admit that "temperament and training" alike prevented his acceptance of traditional points of view. The Indian paṇḍit rarely attempts to correct the European scholar who may entertain what he knows is a false view: one has to ask the right question before one gets the right answer. The Buddhist *dhamma* in the same way, like many other "secret doctrines" protects its own "secret." What is in any case highly significant is the synthesis of Śaiva and Bauddha cults that is so conspicuous in the Indian Middle Ages.

[a] Cf. J. 5. 22 where the *ucchedavādī* ("Annihilationist," "Materialist") is defined

that " There is assuredly another world " (*santaṁ yeva, kho pana paraṁ lokam*) [1] and as against " Arhats versed in the other world " (*paraloka-viduno*) is " a bad-liver, a man of false view (heretic), a denier " (*dussīlo . . . micchā-diṭṭhi natthikavādo*, M. 1. 403, cf. A. 2. 31 and S. 3. 73). *Natthika* in S. 1. 96 does not mean " empty of hand " or " one who refuses alms " (!) but a " denier " as above: we cannot understand the translator's comment " we find no parallel to this term." In S. 2. 17 *natthitā*, " Not-ism " and *atthitā*, " Is-ism " are the two extreme views of denial and affirmation which are popularly maintained with respect to what may be called the question of the reality or persistent identity of the world or of the individual, in which connection it is further debated whether it is the same individual who in this life or in another both acts and reaps the reward of acts, or whether one acts and another reaps. The Buddha teaches a Middle Way [2] of " Causal Origination " (*paṭiccasamuppāda*) according to which " things " are to be regarded without any " in themselves " [3] and only as phenomena (*rūpa*) that have arisen in such and such a way (*yathā-bhūtam*, " as-become "), viz. in an ordered causal sequence. The gist of this doctrine (stated again very clearly in M. 1. 421) has been admirably summarized by the translator in *Kindred Sayings* 2. 18, note: " The subject of the resulting experience is himself the result of the causal experience, as much

as one who maintains that " There is no such thing as going from this world to another; this world is cut off " (*ito paraloko-gata nāma natthi, ayaṁ loko ucchijjati*). In J. 6. 225 the same heresy is supported by the argument " for who has ever come back thence? " (*ko tato hi idhāgato*), an appeal to the common experience that the dead do not return (as stated also in D. 2. 226 and J. 2. 242 and in accordance with the normal doctrine of the Brāhmaṇas and Upaniṣads, SB. 2. 6. 1. 6, 13. 8. 4. 12 etc. and CU. 8. 2. 3).

[1] Cf. Udāna 80, *atthi ajātam abhūtam akatam asaṁkhatam*, " There *is* an Unborn, Unbecome, Not-made, Without-composition."

[2] Boethius, *De duab. nat.* 7. maintains that faith holds a middle course between contrary heresies. Fact and fiction alike are " what we *make* of " our observations; neither is an absolute, or more than a useful *façon de parler*, neither are any but statistical proofs available for the recognition of fact or fiction. Truth itself is transcendent with respect to fact and fiction alike, as is Goodness with respect to virtue and vice, and Beauty with respect to lovely and unlovely.

[3] No Buddhist would deny that appearances appear. If our apprehension of these appearances can be corrected by closer observation, it may serve practical ends, but

and as little identical as is, say, the tree with the seedling" (or the child with the man). For us today, whose view is animistic and whose interests are psychic rather than spiritual, and who think accordingly of a sentient identity as persisting through life or even after death,[4] this would be an "Is-ist" solution.[5] But for the Buddhist (as for PLATO, *Symposium* as cited in *Indian Culture*, 3, 26, note 2, cf. PLUTARCH, *Moralia*, 392 [6]) this does not follow: the persistence of an identity even from day to day is not a "fact" but a merely "conventional truth"; the fact is that as in the monkey parable of S. 2. 95 "will, mind, knowledge (*cittam, mano, viññānam*, i. e. the whole mental personality), this every day and every night arises (*uppajjati*) as one thing and is destroyed

the better observation is still only the actual or theoretical registration of an appearance (shape), and so on ad infinitum. This will apply even if "things" are reduced to mathematical formulae, which are still "shapes." The question "Is there a thing in itself?" is meaningless: we can only ask "Is there a form corresponding to the matter (dimension or number)?" The traditional answer assumes the existence of such a form or idea of the thing, as its eternal reason; this is a "reality," but observe that we are now no longer dealing with a self-subsistent thing "in itself" but with the thing "in intellect" and consubstantial with this intellect. It is in this sense that the metaphysician is a "realist": popular and scientific "realism" (= philosophical "nominalism") coincides with "aestheticism' and "sentimentality."

[4] Few if any materialists have attempted to disprove the immortality of the "soul" by adducing its manifest mutability, or by the argument that whatever has had a beginning in time must also end in time. That the scientist would rather disprove the spiritualist's "phenomena" than disprove the latter's interpretations of them is significant of the former's real position. For the metaphysician the phenomena, however well attested, are of no more interest than any other phenomena; but his interpretation of them is very different from the spiritualist's (cf. René GUÉNON, *L'erreur spirite*). The attitude of orthodox religion (essentially one of indifference) is also very "correct"; in any case only the "intellectual virtues" survive, and these are certainly not those that the "dear departed" are said to display. How far the Buddhist is from the spiritualistic position appears not only in the whole treatment of "individuality" (liberation being precisely from the "personality" for the survival of which the spiritualist adduces "proofs"), but conspicuously in Sn. 774 where the question "What shall we come to be after death" (*kiṁ su bhavissāma ito cutāse*) is one that can only be asked by ignorant worldlings.

[5] The doctrine of "Causal Origination" is expressly described as "profound" and "hard to be understood" by those who of an altogether different temperament and training (S. 2. 92 and 2. 267, D. 3. 40, etc.).

[6] PLUTARCH, *Moralia*, 392 D: "Dead is the man of yesterday, for he is passed into the man of today; and the man of today is dying as he passes into the man of tomorrow. Nobody remains one person, nor is one person . . . Our senses, through ignorance of reality, falsely tell us that what appears to be, is."

nirujjhati) as another," and as in the parable of the chariot,[7] S. 1. 135 where the name of " essence " (*satta*) is said to be given only conventionally (*sammuccā*) to what is not really a simple substance, but an aggregate. In the same way at death " the soul and body that were in a previous becoming is destroyed without residue and another steps forward " (*pūrimabhave nāma-rūpam asesaṁ niruddham, aññam uppaññam*, Vis. 414), and it is a heresy to maintain that " *this* consciousness (*idaṁ viññānam*) concurs and migrates (*saṁdhāvati saṁsarati*) without loss of identity (*anaññam*, M. 1. 256) ; [8] and yet it cannot be said that death is an automatic release from evil and from works (Mil. 72) because " beings (*sattā*) are the heirs of acts (*kamma-dāyadā*) ." [9] It must *never* be overlooked that traditional doctrine makes no distinction in principle between our daily deaths and births and death and birth " when the time comes ": this together with an understanding of what is meant by the two selves [10] (in Buddhism the great or fair and little or foul selves) are essential to a grasp of any Indian scripture. As to the survival of personality, whether from day to day or life to life, the Buddha teaches a Middle Way of understanding—that of continuity without identity.

It remains only to add that the corresponding Skr. *nāstika* and *nāstikya* = *natthitā* are found in Brahmanical contexts. In MU. 2. 5 *nāstikyam* is grouped with fear, hunger, anger, ignorance, etc. in a long list of *tāmasa* qualities: BG. 2. 42 gives the sense of Pāli *natthika*, but not the word itself, thus, " Flowery words are uttered by the stolid, whose delight is in the literal sense of the Vedas, saying ' There is nothing more ' " (*nānyad astīti vādinaḥ*). In the

[7] The " chariot " in Indian scripture generally is the psycho-physical vehicle, itself an aggregate, in which the simple substance of the Spirit " rides."

[8] Cf. in M. 1. 366 *alam . . . aññathattāya*, " Have you had enough of otherness? " i. e. " of the vicissitudes " of life.

[9] For inheritance in this sense see BU. 1. 5. 17 and Kauṣ. Up. 2. 15 (*pitāputrīyaṁ sampratti* or *sampradānam*) and JB. 1. 18. 10 *tasya putrā dāyam upayanti*.

[10] The one an essence (spiritual or intellectual), the other an existence (psycho-physical and sensitive). In Christianity, the soul to be saved and soul to be lost in Luke 17. 33, or hated, Luke 14. 26, the spirit as sundered from soul in Heb. 4. 12: the soul to be " hated " being precisely the *psyche* of the " psychologist." So also for Rūmī, " the soul (*nafs*) is hell " (*Mathnawī*, I. 1375): cf. JUB. IV. 26, *mano narakaḥ*, etc.

same way KU. 2. 6, although not mentioning the term *nāstika*, actually defines the "Nothing-morist" in words identical with those of M. 1. 403 and J. 5. 228 cited above; viz. as one "Who holds that 'There is no other world but this'" (*ayaṁ loko nāsti para iti mānī*), i. e., who denies that there are possibilities other than possibilities of manifestation. For Manu *nāstikya* is an *ahetuvāda* and effectively an *acchedavāda*: we find in 3. 65 that "by the denial of causality, families are soon destroyed" (*nāstikyena ca karmāṇāṁ kulāny āśu vinaśyanti*), which we understand to mean that to deny the inheritance of the father's karmic character by the son is to deny the reality of filiation, and thus to "destroy the family," as traditionally understood: for from this point of view, where there is no hereditary transmission of a vocation and a character, therefore no family line. In the same way *Manu* 8. 22, a kingdom infested by *nāstikas* is destroyed; in 2. 11, and 3. 150, *nāstikas* are grouped with thieves, belittlers of the Veda, outcasts, śūdras, etc. and in 4. 163 and 11. 67 *nāstikya* is coupled with belittling the Veda and with murder.[11]

[11] That from an Indian point of view the lineage ceases as soon as characteristic habit of the family is neglected is clearly seen in the Makhādeva Sutta (M. 2. 75-83); it is the "lovely custom" (*kalyāṇa vaṭṭa*) of this royal line that when the barber finds the first grey hair in the king's head, the king adopts the religious life and hands over the kingdom to his son; this tradition is maintained for 84000 years, but broken at last, the Buddha remarking "When on the part of one of two successive persons there is a breaking down of such a lovely custom, the former of them is the last (of the line)," *so tesaṁ antimapuriso hoti*. In the same way the carpenter whose son should become a shopkeeper would certainly be considered the last of his line. A memory of the same point of view survives in the attitude of the parent whose son or daughter has committed some heinous offence and who says "You are no child of mine," or even simply "disinherits" the child. The extension of a lineage is literally the repeated rebirth of fathers in sons; each of whom is thought of as taking his father's place in the world. This is the principle of hereditary vocation, and it underlies all the resistance that is offered to the breakdown of the caste system in accordance with which one's function is determined by heredity and not by personal choice. It would hardly be possible to deny that in modern times and before our eyes "civilization" (in this sense, that of the Indian "family and kingdom") has been destroyed by skepticism (materialism), individualism (involving free choice of occupation) and the "rise" (to power) of the proletariat (Śūdra). In a Dictatorship there is government by a single Śūdra, in a Soviet government by a few Śūdras, and a Democracy government by many Śūdras; none of these conditions correspond to Indian conceptions of civilisation or order; what the modern terms progress is for the traditionalist disintegration.

We conclude that the *nāstika* is a nominalist, a denier especially of any but empirical truths: and that the word can best be rendered by "skeptic," a word that has the further advantage of corresponding in value to Pāli *diṭṭhika*, generally in the bad sense of one who entertains *false* opinions.

Nāga. While in the vast majority of cases *nāga* as type or epithet of the Buddha or other Arhat is "elephant," there is a text of special interest, the Vammīka (Valmīki) Sutta, M. 1. 142-145, in which the *khīnāsava bhikkhu*, i. e. Arhat, is typified by a *nāga* that is unquestionably a cobra. A certain Deva appears to the elder Kumāra Kassapa and says "Almsman, almsman, this is an ant-hill that flames by day and smokes by night." The Brahman answers "Take a spade, Sumedha, and dig it up."[1] The Deva accordingly digs, and unearths a variety of objects, which he is told to reject, and to dig further. At last he comes to a cobra (*nāga*), and says, "A cobra, your reverence" (*bhadante*). The Brahman answers "Let it be, harm it not, pay it honour."

At this point something is missing; it must be understood that the Deva asks fifteen questions about what has been found, and that Kassapa cannot answer them. The Deva then tells Kassapa to put the questions to the Buddha, whose answer will be convincing. He does so, and the Buddha explains that the interpretation (*adhivacanam*) of the ant-hill is "the body," of the fire "acts," of the smoke "thoughts," of the Brahman "the Tathāgata, the Arahat, the Fully-awakened"; of Sumedha an "almsman still a pupil," of the spade the "Aryan insight," of the digging "heroic effort,"[2] of the various objects "bonds, etc. to be rejected," and of the cobra (*nāga*)[3] "the almsman freed of the foul

[1] CHALMER'S version confuses the speakers; it is quite clear from the sequence of the text that "Brahman" refers to Kassapa, and "Sumedha" to the Deva. From DhA. 3.147 we learn that the Deva had been a monk in the time of the Buddha Kassapa and had arisen in the Brahmā-world as a non-returner but not yet fully perfected.

[2] Digging for buried treasure, in a spiritual sense, appears several times in RV.

[3] In the chapter immediately following, two Arahats are described (M. 1.151) as "two great *nāgas*," and it is probable that in this case also it is *nāga* as "snake" rather than *nāga* as "elephant" that is meant. In Mahāvagga 1.24-25 where the Buddha overcomes Ahi-nāga in the Jatila fire-temple he is referred to as *manussa-*

issues (*khīnāsava bhikkhu*): Let him be, harm him not, do him honor." We learn from J. 1. 147 and DhA. 3. 147 that as a result of these interpretations Kassapa became an arahat.

In one other context (S. 5. 47, cf. 5. 63) the attainment of maturity by almsmen is compared to the development of young snakes (or eels)[4] who are born in the hills and go down to the sea by way of the lakes and rivers, only attaining their full development in the sea, which is here an equivalent of *nibbāna, amata* (see "Samudda").

It is thus firmly established that *nāga* in the ophidian sense may be the symbol of an Arhat or Buddha. Further evidence is afforded by Dh. 179 "That Buddha whose 'pasture' is infinite (*ananta-gocaram*), being without feet (*apadam*, a kenning for 'snake,' and implying also 'leaving no track'), by what track can you track him down?" (*kena padena nessatha*). This text is closely affiliated to BU. 3. 8. 8 where the Brahman is *acakṣuḥśrotraṁ tad apāṇy apādam . . . anantaram* and Muṇḍ. Up. 1. 2. 6 where the Brahman is *adṛśyam agrāhyam agotram avarṇam acakṣuḥśrotraṁ tad apāṇy apādam* etc., and, it may be added with Shams-i-Tabrīz, "The last step, to fare without feet" and "In me is no 'I' and no 'We,' I am naught, without head, without feet" (NICHOLSON, *Shams-i-Tabrīz*, pp. 137, 295).

At the same time we have wished to point out the parallel in Greek mythology, where not only may Zeus (= Dyaus Pitṛ = Varuṇa = *apara* Brahman = Buddha *parinibbuto*) be represented as

nāga and here *nāga* has certainly its ophidian sense; that the Buddha "fights fire with fire" (*tejasā tejam*) corresponds to TS. 5. 2. 4. 1 where the kindled Agni and "the Agni that was before *hate one another*." In many other contexts the value of *nāga* is uncertain.

[4] The word is *nāga*, but the description suggestive rather of an imperfect knowledge of the life-history of eels than of snakes. If eels were regarded as "snakes" this may in part account for the characteristic association of *nāgas* with the Waters, but does not affect the symbolic values.

Nāga is probably also "snake" in M. 1. 386 *nāgasssa pantasenassa khīnasaṁyojanassa*. Elsewhere *nāga* as a symbol or epithet of the perfected Buddha or Arhat is usually "elephant," and always, of course where the symbol of the *hatthi-pada* is involved, *nāga* = *hatthi, gaja*. It is from a different point of view, of course, that the elephant's track *can* be followed up, as for example in Mil. 346 *yathā pi gajarājassa padaṁ disvāna* and similar texts corresponding to the doctrine of the *vestigium pedis* in Brahmanical contexts and in Christianity.

a snake, but the Hero entombed is also a snake: HARRISON, *Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion*, fig. 96 (the snake is assuredly *within* the tomb) is the very picture of an Indian *thūpa* such as is erected for the Buddha (passim), or any *parinibbuto bhikkhu* (Udāna 8). Without pursuing the subject further we shall only remark that if the snake is the symbol both of an imperfect nature to be abandoned and of a perfected nature to be realized, this corresponds to the double value of "non-being" (1) as a natural evil to be escaped from and (2) as a supernatural good to be attained, and to the polarity that is proper to all "negative" symbols, which imply on the one hand a privation and on the other a freedom from any limiting affirmation.

Niccakappam. At M. 1. 249, where after delivering a discourse, the Buddha says that he composes and settles his heart, focuses it and synthesizes it (*cittaṁ saṇṭhāpemi sannisādemi ekodi-karomi samadahāmi*) and that this is in conformity with the former *samādhi*, "in which *niccakappaṁ niccakapaṁ viharāmi*," the translator renders by "in which I always dwell." This is to confuse *niccakappam* with *niccakālam*: the meaning is "which I enjoy, or in which I rest, *whenever I will*." "Always," indeed, contradicts both the sense of the present context, in which the Buddha speaks of himself as entering into this *samādhi* at a certain time, and that of such passages as M. 1. 482 in which the Buddha's knowledge as a man, as "Gotama, now waking and now sleeping," from his knowledge in contemplation.

Nibbāyati, nibbāna. It is familiar that *nibbāna* = *nirvāṇa* implies the extinction of a flame. *Nirvāṇa* is literally "not-blowing," or more technically, "despiration": *nibbutam* = *nirvātam* thus corresponding to *avātam* in RV. 10. 129. 2, *tad ekam ānīd avātam* being the exact equivalent of ECKHART's "Dā diu zwei apgründe in einer glicheit sweben gegeistet und engeistet ("equally spirated, despirated"), dā ist ein hōhez wesen" (PFEIFFER, p. 517). The PTS Dictionary, s. v. *nibbāna* starts, however, with the erroneous statement that *nir-vā* means to "blow," ignoring the regularly privative value of *nis*. Insofar as *nibbāna* depends upon *nirvā*,

then, it implies an extinction or death by ceasing to blow, i. e. ceasing to breathe, and not an extinction by blowing " which latter process," as the Dictionary remarks with unconscious pertinence to the history of the idea, " rather tends to incite the fire than to extinguish it ": Agni being in fact very often referred to as " quickened " (*jūtaḥ*) or " churned " (*mathitaḥ*) by the Gale (of the Spirit),[1] Vāta, Vāyu, Mātariśvan, with whom he can also be identified, in accordance with the principle that both Agni and Vāyu are " self-kindled " (RV. 1. 12. 6; AB. 2. 34). Furthermore (Dictionary, *ib.*) the earlier references are " to the fire going out, rather than to the fire being put out," for which there are excellent metaphysical reasons as well as those " ethical " reasons to which the Dictionary refers. The question of a being " blown out " does not, in fact, arise at any time in connection with the history of *nirvā*. The Dictionary, s. v. *nibbāpeti* (causative of *nibbāyati*) has, indeed, " to make cool by blowing " (this repeats the error noted above) and cites RV. 10. 16. 13 *nirvāpaya*, addressed to Agni, who is as a matter of fact besought to cool the ground that he has burnt, the still smouldering pyre; but here *nirvāpaya* (causative imperative) is by no means " make cool by blowing," but " make cease to breathe," or " cease to blow," and in this way extinguish his own flames. To " cool," though not by a "*blowing* " (which would not cool, but only fan the flame) is thus a proper sense of *nirvā*, causative; it occurs thus in J. 3. 157 *sabbaṁ nibbāpaye daram*, " cool all my fever " and survives in Brajabuli, e. g. *nā nibhāy hiyāra āguni*, " It cannot quench the flame at my heart " (Sen, S., *History of Brajabuli literature*, 1935, p. 406). I cannot believe that *nibbāyati* or *nibbāna* have anything to do with any root (*vṛ*) meaning to " cover "; for example J. 6. 196 *jālā . . . nibbāyati* is simply " the fire ceases to draw," and so " goes out."

We can now proceed to notice some of the Pāli and Sanskrit contexts in which *nibbāyati*, or its equivalents, distinctly mean a " going out " of the fire, which is a death in the same sense that

[1] For Agni's despiration, because of which he would go out, and contrasted with his being kept ablaze by fanning or a supply of fuel, cf. SB. 11. 8. 3. 7.

we speak of the fire as "dying down." The sense in which the fire "goes out" is almost always, in fact, parabolical, the reference being to the extinction of the flame of life. In M. 1. 487 the fire is "gone out for want of fuel" (*anāhāro nibbuto*),[2] that food or fuel, of course, by which the empirical consciousness is supported throughout "life": S. 1. 236 refers to the "going out of a flame" (*pajjotassa nibbānam*): Sn. 19 has "My roof yawns wide, my fire's gone out" (*vivaṭa chado, nibbuto gini*). Needless to say, too, that there are many kinds of "fire," and that in many cases it is specifically the fire of anger (*kodha*, A. 4. 90), or more often the fires of passion, delusion and defect (*rāga moha dosa*, S. 4. 261) that are extinguished. In Sanskrit contexts *vā, nirvā* are usually found with direct reference to spiration e. g. KB. 7. 9 where it is a question of the "breaths" (*prāṇāḥ*), and these "though blowing (*vāntaḥ*) in various directions do not blow out" (*na nirvānti*; KEITH's version).[3] When it is specifically a question of the going out of a fire, which no longer "draws" (air) the usual verb is *udan*[4] in which the meanings of "aspire" and "expire" are combined: thus in CU. 4. 3. 1 *yadā agnir udvāyati vāyum apyeti*, "When the Fire gives up its breathing (dies out), it enters the Gale," echoing SB. 10. 3. 3. 8 "When the Fire goes out (*yadā agnir anugacchati*) it is into the Gale that it then blows out (*vāyuṁ tarhi anūdvāti*), wherefore they say 'It has expired'" (*udavāsīt*). In the same way for the Sun, Moon, and Quarters "established in the Gale, they are born again of the Gale, forsooth" (*vāyor . . . punar jāyante*, are "born of the Spirit"). "And the Comprehensor thereof, when he departs from this

[2] Just as in MU. 6. 34 "As fire, of fuel destitude, is quenched in its own source, so the will (*cittam*) by the destruction of its versions is quenched (*upaśāmyate*) in its own source." The hermeneutic interpretation of *nibbāna* as *nir-vana*, "without wood," "without fuel," is based on this aspect of the decease of the fire of life. *Anāhāra* = *anābhoga* as interpreted by MUS in the sense "not deriving nourishment from any external source."

[3] Cf. JUB. 1. 2. 5-6.

[4] Note that *udāna* in the sense of a "spontaneous utterance" is much rather an "aspiration" (actually, not in the sense of "ambition") than an "inspiration." It is a product of the speaker's own elevation. So Mrs. RHYS DAVIDS rightly translates Udāna (the book so called) by "Verses of Uplift" (ignoring, of course, the vernacular and social meaning of "uplift").

world . . . enters into the Gale with his life-breath, and being in and of it (*etanmaya eva bhutvā*) he becomes whichever of these divinities he will, and moves at will" (*ilayati*, Sāyaṇa *saṁcarati, ceṣṭati*).[5] In the same way Praśna Up. 3. 9 "For those whose fiery-energy has expired, so that their fiery-energies are quenched (*tejo ha vā udānas tasmād upaśāntatejāḥ*) there is a regeneration (*punar bhavam*), by way of the consistence of the powers-of-the-soul in the intellect." There can be no question but that the Buddhist *nibbāyati* preserves the values which are contained in the older texts on despiration.

Our principal purpose in this note, however, is to emphasize that *nibbāna*, and a fortiori *parinibbāna*, is always a death or transformation, and to make it clear in what sense the death is a *summum bonum*, and coincident with a regeneration and the power of resurrection. *Parinibbāna* is, in fact, synonymous with the *parimara* of AB. 8. 28, SA. 4. 12-13 and Kauṣ. Up. 2. 12,[6] where "entering into the Gale, and being dead, yet they do not die, because they rise again," with application alike to the divinities and to oneself. *Pari-* is not so much "round about" as (1) "thoroughly" in the sense that "The kingdom of God is for none but the thoroughly dead" and (2) "towards" or "in" as when we speak of "dying *in* the Lord": who in these contexts as in those cited above is Brahman identified with "He who blows (*vāti*) here," i. e. Vāyu, who does not blow yonder (SB. 8. 7. 3. 9) but as *tad ekam*, "That One," "bloweth *and* is still" (*anīd avātam*, RV. 10. 129. 2), nor ever "goeth home," being himself the "home" (*astam*) to which all others return (JUB. 3. 1. 1-3; BU. 1. 5. 22), not excepting the Muni freed from mental and

[5] Motion at will being a necessary consequence of consubstantiality with the Gale of the Spirit which "bloweth where it listeth" (John 3. 8), and "as it will" (*yathā vaśam*, RV. 10. 168. 4).

[6] *Praviṣya vāyau mṛtvā n na mṛcchanti, tasmād eva punar adīranti:* one of the finest of the Indian texts on death and regeneration. The regeneration of the Comprehensor (*evaṁvit*) at death, when he is "born again" of the fire (and "Except a man be born again, he cannot see the kingdom of God," John 3. 3), is prefigured in the ritual, where for example inasmuch as the priest repeats the whole of the hymns "that he brings to birth (*pra janayati*) the sacrificer, who is now an embryo, from the Sacrifice as womb," AB. 6. 9, the Sacrifice itself being identified with the Gale, *ib.* 5. 33.

physical both (*nāmakāya vimutto = nāmarūpayā vimutto*) who "as a spark that is sped by the force of the wind 'goes home' and no count can be kept of him" (Sn. 1074); they are "gone with the wind"; and, as we know, this expression (*vāyogataḥ*)[7] is the same as "unified" (*eko bhūtvā*), both of these being common ways in Indian literature of saying "dead."

It must be realized, however, that there are many deaths, of which that death in due course after which one is laid on the pyre is only one amongst many others. All change is a dying, and at the same time involves the birth of a new man (who may be better or worse than the old, but in our contexts which are concerned with true Wayfarers, is always a better man),[8] as is explicit in S. 2. 95 where "will, thought, discrimination (*citta, mana, viññāna*), all this arises as one and is destroyed as another, every night and every day," and A. 2. 82, where with reference to a change of occupation and status, a man is said to "die to the one and be born to such another" (*tatho cuto itthatam āgacchati*).[9] It is from the same point of view that the application of *nibbuto* and *parinibbuto* to still living human beings must be understood The Mahāsambodhi as a *nibbāna* is the death of the Bodhisattva, and the birth of a Buddha, the Wake,[10] and similarly in the case

[7] *Vāyogataḥ*, accordingly, presumes the fulfillment of the wish so poignantly expressed in the Vedic requiems 10. 14. 8 and 16. 3, *hityāvadyam punar astam ehi, saṁ gacchasva tanvā suvarcā . . . gacchatu vātam ātmā*, "All the accursed (evil) struck away, go home again, be constituted in a body of glory, . . . Fare thy spirit to the Gale."

[8] 1 M. 1. 388-390, however, deals with the case of the man who "goes to the dogs."

[9] Cf. AUGUSTINE, *Contra Max.*, "All change is a kind of death." What is cited above from S. and A. is stated in almost identical terms by PLATO in the *Symposium*, and by ECKHART, "The soul's progression is matter, wherein she puts on new forms and puts off old ones: the one she doffs she dies to, and the one she dons she lives in" (PFEIFFER, p. 530), like BG. 2. 22 and BU. 4. 4. 4, but no more than either of these a doctrine of "reincarnation."

The formula expressing change of occupation is identical with that in which the Buddha's descent from the Tusita heaven is stated, D. 3. 146, *so tato cuto itthatam āgato* (where it may be further remarked that *itthatam āgato* is tantamount to *tathāgata*); and it is in the same terms that a series of rebirths is described, e. g. DhA. 4. 51 *tato cutā seṭṭhikule nibrattā*.

[10] In the same way ordination, in many respects analogous to initiation, is a "birth" (therefore also a "death" of the layman as such), as in M. 2. 103 where we have (1) *yato . . . jāto*, "from the day I was born" and (2) *yato . . . ariyāya jātiyā*

of others spoken of as *nibbuto* or even *parinibbuto* [11] here and now.

Parinibbāyati thus implies not merely the death of a self, but like all deaths whatever, the bringing to birth [12] or making-become (*bhāvanā*) of another self. Every step on the Way uses a "dead self," now seen to be "not mine, not I," as a rung or stepping stone, and it is thus that the Wayfarer's very Self would come into being (*bhūṣṇur-ātmā*, AB. 7. 15), and is more and more clearly revealed (*āvistarām-ātmā*, AA. 2. 3. 2): the final product, "when all has been done that was to be done" (*katakicco, kataṁ karaṇīyam*, passim; *kṛtakṛtyaḥ* in AA. 2. 5 and MU. 6. 30),[13] being the Spirit all-in-being, a finished and perfected Self (*bhāvitattā*, passim; *kṛtātman* as in CU. 8. 13).[14] *Parinibbāyati* in this sense of "bringing to perfection" occurs repeatedly in the striking text M. 1. 446, where the word is used in connection with each of the ten stages of the training of a noble stallion (and it should not be overlooked that the Almsman whose lower self has been brought under complete control (*attā sudanto*) is often compared to a well-trained steed). What we have wished to bring out, then, is that *parinibbuto* in the sense of "dead" has not the limiting value that

jāto "from the day of my birth in the Noble Race," i. e. as a Sakyaputta, a "Buddha's son," birth in this sense being a filiation. To be awakened is the same as to come into being, RV. passim, especially in connection with Agni (*uṣar-budh*). "Wake" in the sense "to be born" may be noted in WIDSITH, line 5, and we can still speak of "waking to the light of day" in this sense.

[11] E. g. A. 2. 155 which distinguishes those who are *parinibbuto* "here and now, before our very eyes" (*diṭṭh'eva dhamme*) and those who are *parinibutto* only "at death" (*kāyassa bhedā*). These two *parinibbānas* are again subdivided according to whether they are attained "with means" (*sasaṅkhāra = sasaṁskaraṇa*) or without, this depending on whether the pupil's powers (*sekha-balāni*) are "dull" (*muduttā*) or "superabundantly manifested" (*adhimattāni pātubhavanti*).

[12] This sense of *bhū* (causative) is explicit in AA. 2. 5 *kumāram . . . bhāvayati*. In many other contexts *bhū* (causative) has the creative significance of *mā*, and similarly where it means to "evoke" a mental image.

[13] AA. 2. 5 *ātmā kṛtakṛtyo vāyogataḥ praiti . . . prayann eva punar jāyate*, "the spirit, all in act, enters in to the Gale and departs, and departing, is regenerated": MU. 6. 30 *kṛtakṛtyo . . . sauraṁ dvāram bhitvā*, etc., "all in act, he breaks through the Sundoor, and follows the path of that one of the solar rays that pierces through the Orb and continues beyond the Brahma world, whereby men attain the highest goal."

[14] *Kṛtātmā brahmalokam abhisambhavāmi*, the "answer" to Sn. 508 *ken' attanā gacchati brahmalokam.*

is commonly attached to this word,[15] but also implies "regenerate." *Parinibbuto* has both of the values that inhere in the word "finished," which can mean either "dead" (as in the expression, "That was his finish") or "brought to perfection" (in the sense that we speak of a "finished product").[16] We need hardly say that all perfection and all peace imply in this way the death of whatever had been imperfect or not at peace; [17] all motion ends when it attains the goal to which it was directed; Death is the

[15] A limiting value that can only be attached to the event of death by those who see *anattani attānam*, "Their self in what is not their self." These must fear death and must grieve, both for their own loss, and for the deceased who "is no more." It is precisely the same kind of grief that is felt by the profane when a religious "leaves the world" or is initiated, which events are also deaths, cf. JUB. 3. 8. 1. On the other hand, funeral rites in a traditional society are occasions, not of grief, but of rejoicing: cf. D. 2. 161 where at the Buddha's decease he is honoured as kings are honoured "with dancing, singing and instrumental music." Z. L. C. was at one time living near the Burning Ghat in Benares; she saw many funeral processions and observed that the "mourner's" faces were radiant. Only once she saw an old man weeping bitterly as he followed the corpse. On pointing this out to her old woman servant, the latter replied with scorn, "*He* is only an ignorant peasant" (or as the Buddhist would have expressed it, an *assuta puthujjana*: it is the "worldly-minded" Devas alone that weep at the Buddha's death, D. 2. 139). The traditional position assumes that the deceased, as *kṛtakṛtyaḥ*, etc., is *vāyogataḥ, punar bhutvā, udita, amṛta*; the traditional way of life presupposing this as its normal conclusion, death being "the ablution at the conclusion of life's ritual," as in CU. 3. 17. 5.

[16] "Finished" in these two senses provides us with the reason (*ratio*) of the well-known superstition of the "evil eye." For only that which is imperfect, unfinished (*aparinibbuto*) is still "alive": to recognize that a thing is perfect is as much as to say that it is a finished product, no longer viable because already *geworden was er ist*, already come to its "end." For this reason (of which he may be quite unaware) the craftsman often leaves in his work some small defect, and for this reason that the possessor of a beautiful object does not like to hear it unduly praised, and will even give it away to the thoughtless admirer; or if it can not be given away, takes steps to "avert" the evil eye. We can also see why the "evil eye" does not necessarily imply an evil intention; the evil consequence is the result of what is usually an inadvertent imputation of "finish" in the sinister sense. And as usual, the superstition or "standover" is only really such when its reason has been forgotten: the superstition of the evil eye corresponds to what may have been a matter of fact in a society more sensitive than ours to the direct effects of mental acts, whether expressed or not expressed in words.

[17] *Santa*, "at peace," Skr. *śānti*, "peace," from *śam*, always in sacrificial contexts "to give the quietus," to slake, to kill. It should not be overlooked that the victim in these contexts is always, in the last analysis, the sacrificer himself, whose ritual death prefigures his final "rest."

"Ender" (*antaka*), but also the solar Eros, the Great Spirit (*mahātman*) who welcomes the perfected at World's End. *Parinibbuto*, literally "despirated," is thus "finished" in both senses of the word; and it is only if we realise this that we can fully understand why the faithful Buddhist when he sees the Buddha's tomb (*thūpa*), is moved not by sorrow, but with the "thrill" (*saṁvejana*) of understanding, and exclaims triumphantly "Here the Tathāgata was altogether finished (*parinibbuto*) with that attainment of despiration (*nibbāna*) that is without residuum of assumption."

Nettiyā. In DhA. 2. 252, *bhava-nettiyā* is not as rendered by BLOOMFIELD "the Eye of Existence," but conduits of existence (or becoming, birth)." Just as in M. 2. 105 etc. *Udakaṁ hi nayanti nettikā*, "Irrigators (makers of channels, or "leads" for the water) conduct the water." *Bhava-netti* is correctly explained in the Dictionary as "leader to renewed existence." We never meet with such an expression as *bhava-cakkhu* (only *māṁsacakkhu*); and even Pāli *netta* = *netra* is more often "that which leads," e. g. "reins" (*nettāni*, S. 1. 26) than literally "eye," which is in any case a secondary and not a primary meaning of the word.

Pacchi. In *kilañja-pacchi*, J. 6. 370 "rush-*baskets*," not as translated by COWELL and ROUSE "rolls of matting." The baskets of J. 6. 370, with their lids, are clearly shown at Bharhut, CUNNINGHAM pl. 25 fig. 3. The Dictionary thinks the etymology "doubtful," but the root is surely *pracchad*, to cover, envelop, conceal.

Pādavāra and **Pādacchida.** DhA. 3. 216 describes the Buddha's ascent to Heaven of the Thirty-three, from Sāvatthi. "He lifted up his right foot and set it down on the summit of Mt. Yugandhara, then he lifted up his left foot and set it down on the summit of Mt. Sineru (Meru), and thus in just three stands (*tayo va pādavāra*), and two strides (*dve pādacchidāni*) he traversed sixty-eight hundred thousand leagues," and there seated himself on Indra's golden throne. BURLINGAME's version, "in three strides, setting foot on earth but twice," reverses the proper meanings of

the two words in question, and is at the same time unintelligible. *Pādāvāra* is the pause in walking, when both feet are brought together; there are three such " stands," first at Sāvatthi, second on Yugandhara, and third on Sineru. *Pādacchida* is, as the word itself implies, the " separation of the feet " in striding: the word corresponds to *padacchedana, padabhājana,* and *padavibhāga,* denoting the analysis of verse to form a *pada* text, the converse of *padasaṁsagga, padasaṁdhi* implying the conjunction of the words and corresponding to *pādāvāra.* Not only does the corrected rendering make sense, but it enables us to recognize the correspondence of the Buddha's two with the first two of Viṣṇu's three strides; the summit reached by the Buddha on this occasion is solar, like that which he assumes on Mt. Ghṛdrakūṭa, not supra-solar, the Heaven of the Thirty-three over which the solar Indra presides being neither a Brahmaloka nor an aspect of Nibbāna.

Pādavāra and *padavāra* occur also in J. 1. 213 and 506 (not 62, cited also by the Dictionary): in the latter context it is especially clear that a pause is implied, the description being of a deliberate walk " as though at every step (*padavāre padavāre*) he were putting down a bag of a thousand pieces of gold,"—which could not be done without pausing. It may be pointed out that it is in fact always with one foot that a stride is taken, the other being left behind during motion. In the Bharhut relief (CUNNINGHAM, pl. 17, centre) representing the subsequent descent at Saṁkassa we therefore see on the topmost rung of the ladder one foot, and on its lowest rung the other: the descent is made in a single stride; we have the actual picture of a *pādacchida.* It is in the same way that the Sun has regularly " one foot " or ray with which he walks and thus reaches every creature upon whom he bestows its being, RV. etc., passim, but the feet of Death (who is also the Sun), thought of as *planted* in the heart (*hṛdaye pādāv atihatau,* SB. 10. 5. 2. 13, are *two,* " and when he separates them, he departs " (*āchidyotkrāmati*): where *āchidya* is rather " separating " than EGGELING's " cuts off," since it is actually a *pādacchida* that takes place at death, when the spirit " strides away " (*utkrāmati*), or as in BU. 4. 4. 3, where " this spirit, striking down the body and dismissing ignorance, striding another stride (*anyam ākramam*

ākramya), draws itself together," i. e. enters into its source, returns to itself, *ākramya* again implying a *pādacchida*.

The SB. text continues, " And when he (Death, the Person in the solar Orb) ascends (*utkrāmati*), this person (in the right eye) dies. Hence they call the former (*etad*) the ' departed ' (*pretam*) and say of the latter (*asya*) ' It has been cut off ' " (*āchedi*).[1] The *preta* is the immanent *ātman*, the " ghost " that the man " gives up " when he " expires," " that *other* self of his " that having done its work " departs " (*praiti*) when the time comes (AA. 2. 5), while the psycho-physical manifestation is left behind, just as one foot is left behind in striding.[2]

It should be noted that *pāduka* in Pāli is always " slipper," and is not a proper term to be applied to the footprints as represented in art. We find in the literature only *pada* or *pāda* for " footprint " as well as for " foot "; for example, in M. 1. 175 f. and S. 1. 86 *tathāgatapada* and *hatthi-pada* are " Buddha's footprint " and " elephant's footprint." The expression *pada-valañja* occurs once, in DhA. 3. 194, where the " foot-trace " is left by the Buddha is referred to as a *pada-cetiya*, which last is clearly the term that should be used in iconographic descriptions.

Pabbāhati. Not in the Dictionary. Skr. *prabarh, pravṛh*; as in KU. 2. 13, *pravṛhya* (*aṇum*). *Pabbāheyya* and *pabbāḷhā* (v. l.

[1] EGGELING's version is insufficiently literal, ignoring the distinction of " former " and " latter."

[2] It is in just the same way that in the introductory sacrifice (*prāyaṇīya*), the sacrificer (who has just undergone the ritual death of initiation) " proceeds " (*praiti*, AB. 1. 7) to the world of heaven—leaving behind him, of course, the human self to which he will only return (as from the truth to what is false) when the operation is abandoned, and he formally desecrates himself (SB. 1. 9. 3. 23 with VS. 1. 5, AB. 7. 24, cf. SB. 3. 9. 4. 2), the human self that he sacrifices in the rite (as *ātma-yajñī*, so as to be " emptied " of self (SB. 3. 8. 1. 2). What is thus " left " behind is an *ahi* in the sense of JB. 3. 77 (*yad ahīyata tad ahīnām ahitvam*); cf. PB. 12. 11. 11 where Kalyāṇa is " left behind, for he had told a lie " (as men do, but the Gods do not, passim) and becomes a *śvitra*, i. e. *ahi*.

Preta is then, at least originally and properly, the immanent deity, the " ghost," i. e. Sanctus Spiritus, that a man " gives up " when he " expires " (*apānati, ucchvāsati*, etc.). If *preta* (and especially Buddhist *peta*) comes to mean also " ghost " in a much lower sense, it is in the same way that Yakṣa, originally = Brahman, Ātman, Daimon can become also " demon," and that " spirit " can refer to such all-too-human entities as those with which the " spiritualist " concerns himself.

pavālhā) occur in D. 2. 17 meaning "might draw forth" and "drawn forth." The Dictionary reference of *pavālhā* to *pravṛh* is certainly correct, for the Pāli *muñjaṁhā isīkam pabbāheyya* corresponds exactly to *muñjād iṣīkāṁ vivṛhet* in JB. 2. 134 and similar contexts. The metaphors are repeated in M. 2. 17. The Pāli versions show clearly that the real meaning is not so much "might draw the reed from its sheath" as "draw the arrow from the reed"; if the *isīkā* had not been thought of as "arrow" there would have been no point in the words *añño muñjo añño isīkā*. It is plain that when the fletcher goes to the *muñja* marshes to gather shafts, he pulls them from the plants which are left in place, and that what he pulls out is for him the "arrow" and what is left the "plant." The metaphor applies in the Pāli contexts to the drawing out of a supernatural body from this mortal body.[1]

Pāsa. In J. 3. 282, COWELL and ROUSE misrender *pāse vijjhitvā* by "which pierced dice"; the Bodhisatta, however, is the subject of *vijjhitvā*, and *sūcim* its object; the meaning is "perforated with an eye." *Supāsiyam* and *supāsam* below mean "having a well-made eye." COWELL and ROUSE render *akakkasam* in the same context by "quickly threaded" (a legitimate paraphrase of *supāsiyam*), but the *word* (Skr. *akarkaśa*) means smooth, and occurs in this sense also in Sn. 632.

That *pāsa* (Skr. *pāśa*) can mean "needle's eye" is of double interest. In the first place *pāśa* is essentially "loop," and as such "noose," etc. The application of a word meaning "loop" to the eye of a needle suggests a period when the first metal needles were made of wire with one end bent over to form a "loop" or "eye." And in the second place because the "eye of the needle" (and such a needle in particular as the Bodhisatta makes in the Jātaka, "it cannot be told how, but only that the purposes of the Buddhas succeed," *ijjhanti*) is a recognized aspect of the Janua Coeli, Sundoor and "narrow gate," and *pāśa* being also "noose" (in the hands of Mṛtyu, Yama and Varuṇa) we realize that the loop of

[1] In these contexts *isīkā* is no more "reed" (the plant) than *asi* (sword) is *kosi* (scabbard), or *ahi* (snake), *karaṇḍa* (slough).

Reply of Dr. C. A. Rhys Davids Aug. 37.

In his informative article of July last, 'Some Pali Words', Dr. C. has incidentally ~~given~~ expressed himself in a way that has given me pleasure. He says, he is 'appalled' by something I have written! This may be less pleasant than if, as he elsewhere says, he agreed with me. But it is the next best thing. He has, like one about to become convalescent, sat up and taken notice. Others haven't got so far as that, & hence I have taken the advice of a French wit & said it again & again these eight years. This is the position I took up, on the strength of Pali evidence, in chap. IX of my Sakya or Buddhist Origins, 1931: 'Musing' (Dhyana). I there said, that Jhana was not contemplation, but training in attention to psychic susceptibility. The word sati (smṛti) is strained to mean 'attention', for which there was no fit word, & which my husband was compelled to call 'mindfulness' rather than 'memory.' Jhana, I maintained, & still maintain, was, not introversion, but extraversion; or at least that interesting blend of the two known to us psychics, who hear the voice internally (the Buddhists called it parato ghosc (sound from beyond) which claims emphatically to come, as Aristotle said of a kind of nous, thurathen, from without. That my view is based on collective evidence which, taken together, is for me crucial, the good Doctor ignores. More's the pity, since he at least, as some do not, does consult Pali literature. That evidence has convinced my co-translators: Messrs Woodward & Hare & Miss Horner. Let him & others test it.

On one other point Dr. C. goes only halfway with us. Under item Bhū, he judges we have done what Americanese delightfully calls wishful thinking This is in Mr. W.'s trans. of Ang. ii, 35 & my To Become or etc. where we take the future: manussam na bhavissāmi... not as the conjectural 'I'll

not be' of Irish idiom (as in the first part of the Sutta),but as 'I shall not become' i.e. be reborn--- af frequent use in both Pali idiom & Upanishads. Our wishful t inking is apparently the extreme of un-wishfulness to credit Gotama (Buddha) with a sentiment about himself--- a sentiment which we do not express--- Actually our rendering is based on the context. The speaker is made to say,that, inasmuch as he has got rid here of all that would need further training in rebirth, he will not become,be reborn ,as a,b,or c. He is purger from all that,hence,as I have claimed (in JRAS. 1933,910) he says 'Call me purified (suddho),not ,as the ecclesiastically emended text has it, buddho. Here is no more room for a conjectural future; here is a superman, so deemed, shown predicting ,not conjecturing about,his future existence.

Death's lasso is still another aspect of the Gate, and that to slip through the noose without its tightening upon you is the same as to have passed through the jaws of Death without their closing upon you, just as the " threading of the needle " is the passage of the Sundoor in the symbolism of embroidery.

So far, of course, with reference to the " last death of the soul," in which the " threading of the needle " is the passage of the Sundoor. To pass through the needle's eye (cf. DANTE, *Purgatorio*, 10. 16) or to evade the noose can also be used with reference to any passage, all passages implying change, and all change a dying (to what was before). We are concerned here only with the general symbolic equivalence of the eye of the needle and loop of the noose.

Piṇḍaka, in J. 6. 376 it must be the globular termination or finial of the handle of the umbrella. This is supported by the facts that Skr. *piṇḍaka* is cited from a lexikon as " nave of a wheel," and that in the *Aupapātika Sūtra*, § 16, *piṇḍiya* corresponds to *uṣṇīṣa* in its later sense of " cranial protuberance." Cf. *Sākhā*.

Beluva (-paṇḍu-vīṇā). The Dictionary has " flute " (twice), but this is only a misprint for " lute." S. v. *vīṇā* the Dictionary has " lute, mandoline . . . lyre." The *vīṇā* of the text is, however a postless *harp*. For this and the Pāli names for other parts and appurtenances of the harp see my " Parts of a *vīṇā* " in *JAOS* 57 (1937), with further references. The Dictionary in particular misrenders *koṇa*, which is not " bow " but " plectrum."

Bhū. The following discussion is by no means to be taken as an argument against the general position taken by Mrs. RHYS DAVIDS in *To become or not to become*; I am in agreement with this position. The discussion is solely with reference to the meaning of the future form *bhavissati* in A. 2. 35 where the Brahman Doṇa finds the Buddha's wheel-marked footprints and, as he looks at them, says to himself " It cannot be that these are the footprints of a human being." It is not denied that *na bhavissati*, although future in form, has here the conjectural value " cannot be," with reference to the present fact, and not to any future becoming; that the footprints *are* surely not those of a man is the point. Before

going further it may be remarked that there is no dispute that the future form of *bhū* can have this gnomic value in Pāli; of countless examples, not to mention those given by Mrs. Rhys Davids herself, I cite only J. 6. 364 " Your name must be Amarā " (*tvam amarā nāma bhavissati*), certainly with reference to present fact; and J. 6. 365 *udakaṁ na laddham bhavissati*, " It must *be* that you did not get water," i. e. at the time when it *was* needed for the crops. We find the same usage in Sanskrit already in RV. 1. 164. 39 *kiṁ ṛcā kariṣyati*, " What will he do with the verse? " i. e. what use *is* it to him.

So far so good. But in the following context of A. 2. 35 F. L. Woodward (*Gradual Sayings*, 2. 34) and Mrs. Rhys Davids (*To become or not to become*, p. 99) have insisted upon rendering *manusso . . . bhavissati* by " Will he become a human being? " and *na . . . manusso bhavissāmi* by " I shall not become a human being," with specific reference to the future. This is insisted upon in spite of the fact that the Buddha concludes his remarks by saying that all those conditions according to which he might have been a man (or *deva, gandhabba, yakkha*, etc.) have been killed, " so that I *am* the Wake " (*tasmā buddho'smi*). It is in just the same way that at Mil. 346 we find *bhavissati* and *atthi* used synonymously in one and the same connection and both meaning " must surely be " or " assuredly is." It may also be observed that in J. 5. 317 where a similar question is put to Nanda, he replies that he is, or literally " has become " a man (*manussa-bhūto*).

In our disputed context, we have first, a future with an admittedly present conjectural value; then a series of futures with disputed value; and finally a pronouncement definitely in the present, with respect to the questions and answers that intervene. We cannot but think that our authors force the future sense only because of their extreme unwillingness to allow the Buddha to say of himself, " I *am* not a man, or god, or eros, or daimon." It is true that in innumerable contexts of the Nikāyas it is explicit that a Buddha or Arhat is emancipated from being in *any* given way, is nameless, cannot be reached or understood, and so forth; but all these our authors would reject as interpolations or developments. To me the texts appear to be self-consistent; for me the

" higher criticism " of these texts amounts to a dangerous reading out of them whatever does not seem to *us* suitable or true. I take the texts as they stand. But it would seem to be far better to call our passage an interpolation than to translate it in plain contradiction of the syntax. The Buddha is asked " What are thou? " and answers " I am not any what," that is, esssentially, as in Sn. 455-6 *koci no'mhi . . . ākiṁcano . . . carāmi loke . . . akalla mam . . . pucchi gotta-pañham.*

Rasa. We shall see that *vyañjana* is distinguished from *attha* very much as flavour is distinguished from food. In one *Nikāya* text the word *rasa* actually takes the place which is usually taken by *vyañjana*: this is A. 1. 36, where " those who get the flavour of the meaning " is *attha-rasassa . . . lābhino*, and here we can hardly fail to remark that *rasa* is used essentially as it is in the later rhetoric. The earlier history of the word *rasa* needs fuller treatment in a separate article, but we do wish to suggest that even in other than, and older than, Alaṁkāra contexts, and even when the reference is to Deity (*so vai rasa*), the word should be rendered in most cases by " flavour " rather than by " essence." The word " essence " is needed in its proper sense for such terms as *bhūtatā* (" being," in principle; for *atthitā* we should prefer to say " existence," distinguishing *esse* from *essentia vel quidditas*, i. e. " being in itself " from *iti-bhavābhava*), *τὸ ὄν* from *τὸ φαινομενον*. On the other hand, to speak of the " flavour " of knowledge, or of " digesting an idea " (or " assimilation " = *adaequatio rei et intellectus*) or even of " tasting God " (" O taste and see that the Lord is good ") is by no means foreign to the genius of European languages, Latin *sapientia* being etymologically a " tastiness," and as St. Thomas Aquinas expresses it, *Quasi sapida scientia, seu scientia cum sapore* (Pāli *savyañjanam*!), *id est cognitio cum amore* (Pāli *pīti*!)," *Sum. Theol.*, 1. 43. 5, and 2-2. 45. 2-3 with further references.[1]

[1] Cf. Ibn al'Arabī, *Tarjuman al-Ashwāq*, XXV. 4, and his own commentary, where " the saliva in which I tasted white honey " stands for the " sciences of communion and converse and speech which leave a delicious taste in the heart."

The mention of honey here reflects the traditional symbolism of bees and honey,

The *attha-rasassa lābhī* of our text will be, of course, the "Great Self," not the "little self" of A. 1. 249, the "Fair Self" and not the "foul self" of A. 1. 149: just as in AV. 10. 8. 44 it is the "Immortal, Contemplative Self," the Spirit that is, that is "delighted by the flavour" (*rasena tṛptaḥ*). The flavour, in other words, is the "immortal" part of the meaning: and just as in the later rhetoric (*Sāhitya Darpaṇa*, 3. 2-3) the "tasting of the flavour" (*rasāsvādana*) is called the cognate of the "tasting of Brahman" (*brahmāsvādana*), so here it can be said with Augustine that "Even we ourselves as mentally *tasting* something eternal, are not in this world" (*De Trin.* 4. 20).

Lekhanī. Pencil, crayon, brush;[1] or any pointed tool used in carving wood or ivory; never "stencil," as also given in the PTS Dictionary. In A. 2. 200, where the making of a dug-out canoe from a tree is described, the *lekhanī* is the most delicate of the three tools used before the polishing is done. The log is "hewn with axes," or perhaps "adzes" (*kuṭhārehi tacchetvā*), "cut with chisels" (*vāsīhi tacchetvā*), "graven with the 'spearpoint'" (*lekhaniyā likhitvā*) and finally "smoothed with a round pebble" (*pāsānaguḷena dhopetvā*). We render *lekhanī* by "spear-point," the technical name of a certain wood-turner's tool, bearing in mind that one of the meanings of *likh* is to "turn" (wood or ivory),[2] and because in the present case, although there is no question of turning, something like a wood-engraver's pointed tool must be meant; and *likhitvā* by "graven" in the sense of "graven" image. *Lekhaniyā likhitvā* might also mean "carved" in the sense of decorated, but this seems unlikely in the present context, where the "graving" is preparatory to smoothing. It is probable that metal tools are implied at this period, but the process described must have come down from prehistoric times, when the same or similar terms could have denoted stone tools. There

where "honey" is the knowledge of things *sub specie aeternitatis*, and in fact that "nectar" (*amṛta*) of which the gods partake and in virtue of which they are "Immortals" (*amṛtāsaḥ*).

[1] For these senses at a later period see *Technical Studies*, 3, pp. 71, 74. *Likh* occurs in Pāli in the senses draw, write, carve, turn; *lekhanī* as pencil or brush in Mhv.

[2] Cf. *JAOS* 48. 263-264.

remains a further and perhaps even more plausible alternative, according to which *lekhaniyā likhitvā* would mean "painted with a paintbrush": that a polishing with an "agate burnisher" should follow this would be quite intelligible.

Vatra. "Vṛtra": J. 5. 155 *indo vatrabhū . . . sakko*: S. 1. 47, *vatra-bhū*.

Vaḍḍhamāna. I accept Dr. JOHNSON's argument (*JRAS* 1932, pp. 392-398 and 1933, p. 690) to the effect that the three-pointed symbol sometimes called *triśūla* or *triratna* in early Buddhist art has properly been referred to as the "*vardhamāna*." It is perhaps only by chance that we do not find any reference to the symbol in Pāli literature, and hence no occurrence of the word *vaḍḍhamāna* with reference to a symbol. The word occurs in early Jaina literature as the name of a symbol. As regards the word in other senses, and primarily those of the root meaning ("increase"), it is curious that the Dictionary, s. v., equates *vaḍḍhamāna* in Dpv. 11. 33 with *vaddhana* in Mhv. 23. 33, overlooking that *vaḍḍhamāna* itself occurs in the very next line of the text in a sense explained in the Dictionary s. v. *vaḍḍhati*. The word occurs also in Mhv. 11. 3; where *vaḍḍhamānaṁ kumārikam* is "a girl in the bloom of her youth" (GEIGER), or as I should prefer to say, "a still growing girl." There is also a Pāli *vaḍḍhanika* meaning a dish from which food is served, and this explains the later Jaina *vaddhamānaga* in the sense of "auspicious vessel" (distinct from *puṇṇa-ghaṭa*).

Vitaṁsa. I fail to see why the proposed etymology (*vi tan*) is "not clear": The meaning is "snare" (for birds): it is proverbially "in vain that the net is spread in the sight of any bird"; the Old Testament abounds in references to the *spreading* of nets and snares; and for illustrations of *outspread* snares see *MFA Bulletin*, No. 210, pp. 50-53.

Vyañjana (contrasted with *attha*). Before we discuss these terms in the Pāli contexts we must assume the meaning of *attha* in relation to *dhamma* discussed above, s. v. *Attha = artha*. It will

also be advisable to consider the meaning of *vyañjana* in pre- and post-Pāli contexts in order to put the question (of considerable interest from the point of view of the history of Indian rhetoric) whether or not Pāli *vyañjana* has really a meaning contradictory of its meaning in these pre- and post-Pāli contexts. The primary sense of the root (*vyañj* is to "anoint," and hence to "adorn," "flavour" (drink, food), and "illustrate" or "manifest." For the first three of these values in RV. cf. GRASSMANN's *Wörterbuch*, s.v. *añj*. *Vyañjana* (n.) is "adornment" in RV. 8. 78. 2. In the later rhetoric, three kinds of meaning (*artha*) of a proposition (*vācakam*) are distinguished, viz. *abhidhā*, *lakṣaṇā* and *vyañjana*, respectively literal, figurative and parabolical (*Sāhitya Darpaṇa*, 2. 3 etc.), the latter coinciding with what is called the "flavour" (*rasa*) of a poetical text defined as a "statement (having the letter for its body and) flavour as its informing-spirit" (*kāvyaṁ rasātmakaṁ vākyam*).

On the other hand, the PTS Dictionary has under *Vyañjana*, "Letter (of a word) as opposed to *attha* (meaning, sense, spirit)," and under *Savyañjana* only "with the letters."[1] Most of the translators render accordingly, *attha* as "spirit" and *vyañjana* as letter."[2] If this could be justified we should be faced with the curious phenomenon of a temporary reversal of the basic mean-

[1] It would be difficult to reconcile this with S. 2. 51 where it is asked "Have you declared Arahatta (*tayā aññā vyākata*), viz. *khīna jāti . . . nāparam itthatāya?*" The answer is that this meaning (*attha*) was not stated "In these very words (*itehi padehi*) or with these very trappings" (*itehi vyañjanehi*). The Buddha responds by saying that by whatever "alternative formula" (*pariyāya*, paraphrase, circumlocution) *aññā* has been declared, one must take it as having been declared.

It may be noted incidentally that Pāli *vyatta* = Skr. *vyakta* (pp. of *vyañj*), and its opposite *avyatta* are applied to persons, not to statements, as if one should speak of an "explicit, or inexplicit speaker" rather than of "explicit, or inexplicit speech"; *vyañjayati* (to "characterize," etc.) occurs only in Commentaries; and that the quite different word *vyākaroti* is rather to "state or propound" than to "explain."

[2] So, I think always, in the PTS. translations by Mrs. RHYS DAVIDS and F. L. WOODWARD. The SBE version of the Mahāvagga by T. W. RHYS DAVIDS and H. OLDENBERG is inconsistent: at Vin. 1. 40-41 (Mhv. 1. 23. 4-9) *attha* is rendered by "spirit" and *vyañjana* by "letter," but 1. 358 (10. 6. 3) *attha* is rendered by "letter" and *vyañjana* by "spirit."

In the last context, text, for *atthāpetā vyañjanupetā* read *atthāpetāvyañjanupetā*, i. e. *atthāpetā-avyañjanupetā*: the contrast is with *atthāpetā ca vyañjanapetā*.

ings of the word *vyañjana*. We have shown, s. v. *Attha*, that the meaning of *attha* is anything but "spirit."

We propose to discuss the word in its Pāli contexts, beginning with the simplest and leading up to the more difficult. In J. 6. 366 Amarā Devī is preparing a rice-pudding with milk, and "adds suitable flavouring" (*tadanurūpaṁ vyañjanaṁ sampādetvā*). When the Bodhisatta closes his teeth on her "flavoured pudding" (*savyañjanaṁ yāgum adāsi*) his sense of taste is thrilled (*rasaharaṇiyo*).

In Vin. 1. 41 an inquirer asks "What does the Master teach?" The disciple answers "I am not able to set forth the doctrine to you at length (*vitthārena dhammaṁ desetum*), but I can tell you its purport briefly" (*saṁkhittena atthaṁ vakkhāmi*). The question replies "Whether you say little or much, tell me in any case the purport (*atthaṁ yeva me brūhi*)—in accordance with its intention, I mean (*atthen'eva me attho*)—why should you make a great elaboration?" (*kiṁ kāhasi vyañjanam bahum*). The answer is the following "doctrinal formula" (*dhamma-pariyāyam*): "Of all things that are of causal origin, the Tathāgata has told the cause, and so too has the Great Monk proclaimed their suppression" (the well-known "Buddhist confession" which is found as an inscription on so many examples of Buddhist art, as if this were the essence of their message). There is no question of "Spirit and letter" here: what the inquirer really wants to know is "what he must *do* to be saved." In terms of the preceding reference, he is hungry and wants primarily food, not caring whether it be "seasoned" or "elaborated." *Attham* is here the application, or immediate bearing of the doctrine; *vyañjanam* its "flavour," and the same as that *attha-rasa* that is tasted only by the few (A. 1. 36).[3]

In A. 2. 160 where we have "when the analytical factors of the

[3] Even briefer is the Buddha's enunciation of *kammavāda* in the two words *paṭisamuppannaṁ dukkham*, with respect to which Ānanda exclaims "It is marvellous, how this whole matter has been stated in a single phrase (*ekena padena*)! Had it been set forth at length, it would have been seen to be deep (*gambhīro*) in fact as well as in seeming!"

meaning (*attha-paṭisambhidā*)[4] have been verified (*sacchikatvā*)[5] both as regards what is laid down (*odhiso*) and what is elaborated (*vyañjanaso*), I then explain them by many alternative-formulae, teach and illuminate them, make them comprehensible, open them up, dissect and spread them out" (*aneka-paryāyena ācikkhāmi, desemi, pakāsemi, paññāpemi, vivarāmi, vibhajāmi, uttāna-karomi*).[6] *Odhiso* here can only refer to the immediate meaning

[4] For the four *paṭisambhidā* see the Dictionary, s. v. The four are *attha, dhamma, nirutti* (= hermeneia), *paṭibhāna* ("illumination," a meaning given in the Dictionary (cf. S. 1. 187 and K. S. 1. 237), in connection with which it may be noted that *pratibhā* in the sense to "flash upon the mind" is hardly "late" Skr., since it occurs in the Upaniṣads). The four meanings would seem to be moral, literal, hermeneutic, and anagogic or parabolical. They are often mentioned in connection with and as if necessary to the attainment of Arahattā, in the formula *saha paṭisambhidāhi arahattam pāpunati*, Mil. 18, etc. Cf. Dh. 352, *nirutti-pada-kovido, akkharānam sannipātaṁ jaññā pubbāparāni ca, sa ve antima-sarīro, mahāpañño, mahāpuriso ti vuccati.* Here there is an unmistakable recognition of the spiritual value of semantic and grammatical scholarship; but it must be remembered that these sciences cannot be exactly identified with their modern "equivalents," *nirukta* being much rather "hermeneia" than "etymology" in our sense.

The students will find it profitable to compare with this the four meanings, literal, moral, allegorical and parabolical in Scholastic Christian exegesis, as defined, e. g. in St. Thomas Aquinas, *Sum. Theol.* 1. 1. 10. Most important and of universal application is the proposition that "The parabolical meaning is contained in the literal." For this reason it is very necessary not only to have understood the precise meaning of the Pāli symbols, but also to translate them literally (*ipsae res significatae per voces etiam significant aliquid*).

[5] We suggest the use of "verify" for Pāli *sacchikaroti* and "verification" for *sacchikiriya* (the so-called "Act of Truth"). Cf. our expression, to make a thing come true." It should be noted, however, that from the Indian point of view, the possibility of this depends upon truth in the agent, cf. J. 1. 214 *bodhisatto . . . saccassa bhavam ārabbha saccakiriyaṁ karonto.* In other contexts we find that "realization" is expressed by the phrase *yoniso manasikāra*, "an original act of intellect."

The use of *sacchikaroti* in the full sense of the words "hear and understand" may be noted in D. 1. 150, where the Buddha, "As being one who has verified it by his own extra-generic-gnosis (*sayam abhiññā sacchikatvā*) promulgates the Law and preaches it, lovely in its beginning, in its middle and in its end, both in its moral and in its spiritual significance" (*sātthaṁ savyañjanam*): and DhA. 3. 361 where *sakkaccan na sunanti* is literally "do not hear with verification," i. e. hear but do not learn.

The same is expected of others: "Whatever Monk or Brahman here and now, by his own extra-generic gnosis has verified the meaning of monasticism and Brahmahood, he has 'arrived'" (*sāmaññattham ca brahmaññattham ditṭheva dhamme sayam abhiññā sacchikatvā, upasampajja viharanti*, S. 2. 46).

[6] Similarly S. 2. 28 *svākhyāto . . . mayā dhammo uttāno vivaṭo pakasito chinna-pilotiko*, "Doctrine well taught by me, spread out, opened up, illuminated, divested of wrapping."

of the text: *odhi* deriving from *odahati*, Skr. *avadhā*, to "set down," analogous to *abhidhā*, the "literal power" of an expression, or "denotation." It is just in this sense, indeed that the text itself is a "footprint" (*pada*), a trace set down and that can be followed up, in the sense of RV. 10. 71. 3 *vācaḥ padavīyam āyan*, and of the "*hatthi-pada*" in Pāli, passim. *Odhi* is thus also like its Sanskrit equivalent *avadhi*, the object to which the mind is directed, and being thus equivalent to the primary meaning of the text, *vyañjanam* can only be the expanded meaning implied by the phrases concluding with *uttāna-karomi*. *Odhi* referring to the actual wording corresponds to *desanam*, "promulgation," *vacanam*, "utterance," *akhyānam*, "narrative," *kathitam*, "relation," *padam*, "verse," etc. *Odhi* refers to the "aesthetic surface" of the doctrine, and in this connection it may be pointed out that what is said in words differs in no way in principle from what is represented in plastic art, the interpretation of which from either a strictly aesthetic or a merely anecdotal point of view being equally superficial and insufficient: as the *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra*, 2. 118-9 expresses it, "The real picture is not in the colours, the principle evades the letter."

We meet with the "four meanings" again in A. 2. 139 in connection with the definition of four sorts of orators (*vādī*), of whom the best is the speaker "who is not brought to a standstill either as regards the practical purport (*atthato*) or the developed meaning (*vyañjanato*): it is impossible for one fully possessed of the four analytical powers (*paṭisambhidā*) to be brought to a standstill in either of these respects."

In A. 2. 148 the first of four ways that conduce to the preservation of the "True Law" (*saddhamma*) is that condition which exists when the Almsman is in full possession of a text "with well-put verses and flavourings (*sunikkhittehi pada-vyañjanehi*): for, Almsmen, if the verses and their flavouring are well put, the practical meaning is likewise easy to follow" (*attho pi sunnayo hoti*). We hark back in this version to the notion of cooking: considering that *pada* corresponds to the rice, and *vyañjana* to the sauce, and that if these are suitably combined, the intellectual nourishment will be readily assimilated.

In D. 3. 127-8 it is said that Almsmen are to meet together and talk over Doctrine, not contumaciously but "comparing moral (or literal) sense with moral (or literal) sense (*atthena attham*) and implicit meaning with implicit meaning (*vyañjanena vyañjanam*), the discussion taking such a form as "To such and such a moral sense (*imassa . . . atthassa*) do these, or these other implicit meanings (*imāni vā vyañjanāni etāni vā vyañjanāni*) correspond most closely?," and conversely. Here it may be noted how the genitives imply that the moral or literal and the spiritual or implicit meanings are reciprocal and inseparable; it is never a question of arbitrary explanations but only of an adequate symbolism, in which there is a contrast but never an opposition of "letter and spirit" (Islamic *es-shariyaḥ* and *el-haqīqaḥ*). In S. 4. 281 and 296 *nānatthā nānavyañjanā* is clearly "different in denotation and in connotation," *ekatthā* in the same context meaning "alike in denotation."

In S. 5. 430 a specifically moral theme, that of *dukkha*, "ill" or "sorrow" is effectively the "moral meaning" with reference to which the Buddha says that "there are definitely various phases and illustrations thereof (*aparimāṇā-vaṇṇā vyañjanā aparimāṇā saṁkāsanā*), and here *vyañjana* is certainly something like "colouring," "disguise," "shade of meaning," a sense quite in accordance with the root meaning of *vyañj*, "to smear on." Similarly in A. 2. 182 where the Buddha says that "he has taught that such and such a proposition is right (*idaṁ kusalam . . . mayā paññatam*), in countless verses (*aparimāṇā padā*), with countless colorings (*aparimāṇā vyañjanā*) and countless enunciations of the spiritual-meaning" (*aparimāṇā dhamma-desanā*).

The most difficult text is that of Mil. 18 where the Buddha's word (*buddha-vacanam*) is learnt by heart at one hearing, is mastered in three months *byañjanato*, and in another three months *atthato*. We should have expected the reverse order of words. We cannot, however, allow the apparent meaning of this isolated text to override that of so many others, and must conclude that the fully developed meaning is thought of here as having been grasped before the application of it was made.

As we have remarked, in nearly all of the foregoing contexts

the translators render *attha* by "spirit" and *vyañjana* by "letter." It is by no means our intention to suggest that the very words "letter and spirit" are out of place in these contexts, but we do say that if these words are used, it is in precisely the opposite sense, *attha* being the "letter" and *vyañjana* the "spiritual" meaning. For we cannot employ the English words "letter and spirit" vaguely but only in one of two ways, either with reference to "literal meaning" and "inner meaning" (a relation expressed in Pāli by saying that "B is the *adhivacanam*, i. e. interpretation, of A"),[7] or in that way in which the words "letter and spirit" (or their equivalents) were used by St. Paul (2 Cor. 3.6) from whom our use of the words descends. Whoever has any doubt as to the meaning of the words of St. Paul should consider AUGUSTINE's treatise, *De spiritu et littera*. St. Paul is not referring to figurative expressions but to the distinction between the moral law and spiritual understanding, the former essential to the active and the latter essential to the contemplative life. It is precisely in the same way that *attha* (as we have seen) refers to things to be done, and *vyañjana* to things to be understood: it would be true to say that in our contexts *attha* and *vyañjana* correspond to what are called *karma-kāṇḍa* and *jñāna kāṇḍa* in Sanskrit. In Vin. 1. 41 it is the fact that an injunction to walk in a certain Way is implicit in the formula that makes it *attha* and not *vyañjana*. We can see also why it is that precedence is given to *attha*: it is just as it for the hungry man, for whom food is the first consideration and flavouring the second; the flavour is better than the food, but not for the hungry man who is still in need of without which he cannot "keep on going"; it is not this "little self," the so-called *attā* or *appattā*, but only the "great self," *mahattā*, "the immortal contemplative self, without desire" of AV. 10. 8. 44 that is "satisfied by flavour" only (*rasena tṛptaḥ*). It is from the same point of view that the Buddha so often refuses to discuss ulti-

[7] It is in this connection that we find the Buddhist parallel of St. Paul's "the letter killeth," viz. in S. 1. 11. where "Men aware only of what can be told (*akkheya*, the *akkhānam*, narrative or parable taken historically and literally) live under the yoke of death." This will apply, of course, as much to the understanding of the carved or painted parable as to the spoken symbol.

mates (such as "is or is not" after death) because they do not pertain or conduce to Wayfaring (*maggana*). Virtue is only a means, indeed; it is dispositive, but not essential to the end. But "whiles we are on the way, we are not there"; virtue is essential to the Way. *Attha* is thus prior to *vyañjana* in practise, but inferior in hierarchy since when the end of the road has been reached there is no more Wayfaring to be done.

We have so far discussed *vyañjana* in what may be called its "good" sense, that sense in which the four *paṭisambhidā* are said to be essential to Arahatta. There are also some contexts in which *vyañjana* as "ornament" is disparaged, for example PugA. 223, where *padaparamo*, "whose ultimate is the verse itself" is explained by *vyañjanapadam eva paramam assa*, "he for whom the verbal ornament only is the prime consideration." That the reference is disparaging is clear also from A. 2. 135, where the final reward (*uṭṭhāna-phalam*) is contingent upon the nature of the mental effort put forth; there are four classes of hearers, "those who understand immediately (*ugghaṭitaññū*), those who understand upon reflection (*vipacittaññū*), those who must be led (*neyyo*, e-*duc*-ated, the Yakkhī of S. 1. 12-13 being a good example), and those whose ultimate is the text itself" (*padaparamo*, the stupid king of J. 6. 131 being an example). *Padaparamo* is then either "literalist" (as condemned in S. 1. 11, where indeed "the letter kills") or in accordance with PugA. the man who cares more about the art of the text than with its meaning, and may be compared to the man who in terms of our first citation (J. 6. 366) might be more particular about the taste of the food than about its nourishing essence. Our immediate concern is with the disparaged *vyañjanapadam* of PugA; where the reference is plainly to artistry considered as the final end of oratory: cf. A. 1. 72, 3. 107 and S. 2. 267 where a *suttanta* characterized by fine sounds rather than fine thoughts is called *cittakkhara* (cf. the later *citrakāvya*), and A. 1. 38 where the syllables themselves (*akkharāni*, thought of as sounds rather than as written letters)[8]

[8] The reader will not forget that *akṣara* is primarily a sounded syllable, and only secondarily a written sign. Indian rhetoric, at least in its beginnings, has therefore more to do with oratory than with "literature" as we think of it.

are called the " sauce or flavour " (*vyañjana*)[9] of poetry. In S. 2. 267 and parallel passages, " The sermons (*suttantā*) preached by the Tathāgata are profound (*gambhīrā*), of profound moral significance (*gambhīratthā*), dealing with the other world (*lokuttarā*) and bound up with the emptiness of this world (*suññatapaṭisaṁyutta*); but a time will come when they will no longer be regarded as things to be studied and mastered; on the contrary, those sermons that are made by poets in the poetical style (*te suttantā kavikatā kāveyyā*), with embellished sounds (*cittakkharā*), overlaid with ornament (*citta-vyañjanā*), and spoken by profane auditors (*bāhirakā sāvaka-bhāsitā*), will be considered worthy of study, and the others will disappear."

We see nothing in all this that is particularly monastic or puritanical, but only something serious; the repudiation of an art for art's sake and of sophistry and of aestheticism. The Buddhist is the same as the Platonic, Aristotelian and Scholastic view of rhetoric as the art of giving effectiveness to truth. As AUGUSTINE says, " I am not now speaking of how to please: I am speaking of how they are to be taught who desire instruction." *Cittakkhara, citta-vyañjana* are " sophistic " in the sense of Augustine's definition, " A speech seeking verbal ornament beyond the bounds of responsibility to its burden (*gravitas*) is called ' sophistic.' " In the same way, " No matter in what connection, when Buddhas preach the Law, it is upon the Law that they lay weight (*gāravam*, etymologically and semantically the equivalent of AUGUSTINE's *gravitas*); they speak as though bringing down from heaven the Aerial River " (*ākāsagaṅgam otārento viya*, DhA. 3. 361).[10] That the preaching of the Law " pierces the skin and flesh [11] and penetrates to the marrow of the bones " (DhA. 3. 361) recalls St.

[9] This is the Dictionary meaning, s. v. *Akkhara*.

[10] It seems to have been overlooked that this is an allusion to the " Descent of the Ganges," well known in the Epic. The simile is far more tremendous to Indian than it could be to European ears: " speaking as if with the roar of Niagara " would be a weak analogy.

[11] *Chavyādi* in full would be as in Vin. 1. 5 etc. *chavi, camma, maṁsa, naharu, aṭṭhi, aṭṭhi-miñja*, " scarf-skin, skin, flesh, sinews, bones and marrow " (*chavi* is generally " complexion," " bloom," and can only be rendered here by " scarf-skin "). At Vin. 1. 83 the whole formula is applied to the love of a son.

Paul's "The word of God is quick and powerful, and sharper than any two-edged sword, piercing even unto . . ." (Heb. 4. 12)[12] and St. AUGUSTINE's "O Eloquence, so much the more terrible as it is so unadorned; and as it is so genuine, so much the more powerful: O truly an axe hewing the rock!"[13]

On the other hand, it must not be inferred that the art of oratory, rightly used, is in any way disparaged. We find, for example, Mahā Kaccāna praised as the "Chief of those who dissect at length the meaning of what has been briefly said" (*saṁkhittena bhāsitassa vitthārena atthaṁ vibhajantānam aggam*), Kumāra Kassapa as the "Chief of flowery speakers" (*citta-kathikānam aggam*)[14] and Mahā Koṭṭhita as the "Chief of the Masters of the Four Meanings" (*paṭisambhidappattānam aggam*), A. 1. 23-24. We find the Buddha praising an Almsman who "in his doctrinal discourse was demonstrating to the brethren, making the Law acceptable to them, setting them afire, gladdening them with urbane words, well enunciated without hoarseness, with exposition of the meaning, pertinent and unbiassed" (S. 2. 280, cf. 1. 241). The same expressions recur in D. 2. 109 where the Buddha explains that he adapts his teaching to his audience ("Whatever may be their sort, I make myself of the like sort, whatever their language, I speak that language"—i. e. becoming as we are that we may be as he is), "But they knew me not when I spoke, and would ask 'Who may this be that speaks thus, a man or a god?' Whereupon I demonstrated the Law, made it acceptable to them, set them on fire (*samuttejetvā*), gladdened them, etc." The argument is always *ad hominem*: for as the *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra* 2. 114 expresses it, "Whatever is not adapted to such and such persons as are to be taught, cannot be called teaching." It is thus that "He preaches the lovely Law, with its moral and spiritual mean-

[12] The completion of the text, "piercing even unto the dividing asunder of soul and spirit" corresponds exactly to the often repeated theme of Buddhist teaching, *na me so attā, sabbe dhammā anattā, suññam idam attena,* etc. and makes the parallel particularly poignant.

[13] The quotations from AUGUSTINE are from the *De doctrina christiana,* 4. Cf. the fuller references in *Art Bulletin,* 20 (March, 1938), pp. 72-77.

[14] At Mil. 1. 1 Nāgasena's discourse (*kathā*) is described as "adorned with parables and types" (*citrā opamnehi nayehi ca*).

ings" (*dhammaṁ deseti . . . kalyāṇam sāttham savyañjanam*, D. 1. 250. It will not be inappropriate to conclude the present article with: "At the close of my discourse I compose and settle my heart, focus and synthesize it (*cittaṁ saṇṭhāpemi sannisādemi ekodikaromi samādahāmi*), in accordance with the former fashion of my interior synthesis (*samādhi*), in which assuredly I abide when and whenever I will" (*niccakappaṁ niccakappaṁ viharāmi*, M. 1. 249).

The net result of the foregoing discussion, and that of Rasa, is to indicate that Pāli *vyañjana* and *rasa* are often very nearly the same thing, a quality that may be regarded either as the most intimate flavour or color of the text, or from another point of view as an overlay of ornament, and thus "too much of a good thing." In any case, *vyañjana* is never "syllable," as it has been rendered at A. 2. 182.

Sākhā and **sākha**. Like the Skr. equivalent *śākhā*, the word occurs in Pāli in the primary sense of "branch" (of a tree), but also in Sn. 688 as "rib" of an umbrella, and it is probable that this was also a meaning of the word in Skr. The word in this sense is of interest because of the coincident (axial) symbolism of "umbrella" and "tree"; the ribs surround the handle (*daṇḍa*, also "stem of a tree") "as branches surround the trunk of the tree" (*vṛkṣasya skandhaḥ parita iva śākhāḥ*, AV. X. 7. 38), forming a "circle" (*maṇḍala*). Cf. Piṇḍaka.

Saṅkha. The primary meaning is "number," hence *saṅkhaṁ gam*, to "be reckoned" or "accounted," as in *Udāna* 55 "they are accounted (*saṅkhaṁ gacchanti*) 'Sons of the Buddha'" (*sakyaputtā*).[a] In this sense *saṅkhaṁ gam* is to "be called," to "get a name." It follows that in a more general way to be "numbered" is to exist in the quantitative and dimensioned (*nimitta*) universe, *saṅkha* from this point of view being equivalent to *mātrā* ("measure," and etymologically "matter," that which is known in terms of "form and phenomenon," *nāma-rūpa*), in which sense

[a] It is in this sense that in RV. 9. 61. 7 Soma is "reckoned with the Ādityas" (*saṁ ādityebhir akhyata*).

saṅkha is almost the exact equivalent of "number" as characteristic of "species" in Scholastic philosophy. To come into being, take birth and be "named" is a good from some points of view, but never a final good, and therefore from another point of view, that of the man who is seeking to become "no one" (*akiṁcana*), an evil. So in Sn. 1074 it is said of the Muni, sped like a flame blown out by the wind, and liberated from name and body (*nāmakāyā = nāmarūpayā*), that he "gets him home (*attham paleti*), he does not get a number" (*na upeti saṅkham*),[1] i.e. he is not cognizable: in the same way it is said of the Arhat, who is past finding out by gods or men in heaven or on earth, that he "has done with number" (*pahāsi saṅkham*, S. 1. 11); it is just such as these of whom Brahmā says, in fact, that he "cannot give any true accounting" (*saṅkhātuṁ no pi sakkomi*, etc., D. 2. 218); and conversely in S. 3. 35 "Whatever it be that a man takes to bed, it is by that that he gets his number" (*yaṁ . . . anuseti . . . tena saṅkhaṁ gacchati*), i.e. his unaccomplished purpose determines his birth[2] (as in MU. 2. 6d).

[1] *Na upeti saṅkham*, like MU. 6. 20 *nirātmakatvāt asaṅkhyaḥ*, "out of count, because without a self": Sn. 1076 *na pamānam atthi*. S. 4. 376-377 is explicit: the Tathāgata is "free of any reckoning" (*saṁkhāya-vimutto*) in terms of any one of the five *khandhas, rūpa, vedana*, etc., i.e. has no psycho-physical "number." "Number if taken as a species of quantity, denotes an accident added to being" (St. Thomas Aquinas, *Sum. Theol.* 1. 30. 3): *quia designatio individui respectu speciei est per materiam determinatum dimensionibus* (*De ente et essentia*, 3. 1), i.e. inasmuch as all things are *nimittāni*, "measured out."

It will be seen from what follows that like all other negative symbols, to be without number (the same as to be nameless) can have either a "good" or a "bad" meaning; *asaṅkhyaḥ* corresponding to *amātra*, and *ajāta*, etc. In the same way there is an *asat* (non-being) that is "naughty" (because of privation of being) and an *asat* (non-being) that is also a plenum (*pūrṇam*) because not limited by a being in any way (*iti-bhāva*).

[2] The idiom corresponds to that of "As one makes one's bed, so must one lie upon it." The corresponding word *anusaya* denotes the condition in which a man is naturally found, and from which he is summoned to arouse himself; and it is no doubt in the same sense that the NT. "Arise, take up thy bed, and walk" should be understood. *Saṅkha* is, in fact, virtually synonymous with *anusaya*, Skr. *anuśaya*, as "bed," *karmic* consequence, and finally "repentance" inasmuch as it is from this predestined condition that one uprises. Similarly *āśaya*: see *karmāśaya* as used by Patañjali, *Yogasūtra* 2. 12 f. (rendered by Woods "latent deposit of karma"), and the discussion by Jaideva Singh in *Rev. of Phil. and Religion* 8. 28 (1939).

There is, however, another use of the word, or rather of the corresponding verb, of no less interest, occurring in Sn. 350, "To do what one will does not pertain to the common herd; it pertains to Tathāgatas to do what is correct," or more literally, "calculated" (*na kāmakāro*[3] *hi puthujjanānaṁ, saṅkheyyakāro ca tathāgatānam*). *Saṅkheyya* here can only be understood as equivalent to *prameya* in the sense of "correct" (an absolute *pramāṇa* is, in fact, attributed to the Buddha; all that the Buddha says or does is said or done well). The converse of the text is also, of course, implied: what is done by the untaught many-folk is informal, *apaṭirūpa, asaṅkheyya*,[4] the Buddhas do what they will. In the same sense *saṅkha* must mean what is "right," one might even say "mathematically right" since it is precisely a question of "number," in Dh. 267 where "He who has ousted good and evil, the walker-with-Brahma, whose course in the world is 'calculated' (*saṅkhāya loke carati*), he is rightly called an 'Almsman'": or conversely, "wrong" when "calculating" (*saṅkhāya*) implies "with ulterior motives," as in A. 2. 143. The use of *saṅkheyya* and *saṅkhāya* in the good sense corresponds to that of *saṅkhyānam* and *asaṅkhyānam* in JB. 2. 69 and 73 where in opposing rites what is done by Prajāpati in good form overcomes what is done by Death informally, and what is "in order" (*saṁkhyānam*) being immortal (*amṛtam*) and what is "inordinate" (*asaṁkhyānam*) mortal (*martyam*),—a distinction corresponding to that of *satyam* from *anṛtam*. It is in the same sense that in an unidentified Sūtra (HOERNLE, *MS. Remains of Buddhist literature from E. Turkestan*, 1, pp. 98-100) *saṁkhyām gacchati* is "reaches fullness."

Samala. This word is cited for the sake of the light it throws on Skr. *śāmulya, śāmūla*. The Dictionary omits to note the immediate Skr. equivalent, *śamala*, but gives the meaning, "impure, contaminated, Vin. 1. 5." We have also *sandhi-samala-saṁkaṭīra*,

[3] *Na kāmakāro*, as in CU. 8. 1. 6 *ihātmānam ananuvidya . . . sarveṣu lokeṣv akāmacāro bhavanti*, "not having known the Spiritual-Self in this life, do not become 'Movers-at-will' in any world."

[4] In very many contexts, of course, *asaṁkheyya* is simply "incalcuable," i. e. of indefinite (not infinite, however) extent: for example where *asaṁkheyya* = *kappa*.

with the general sense of "garbage heap" in S. 2. 279, M. 1. 334 and D. 2. 160; and *dhammo asuddho samalehi cintito*, "an unclean doctrine conceived by foul minds" in S. 1. 137. It seems impossible to doubt that in RV. 10. 85. 29 *śāmulyam* is not (as commonly rendered) "woollen," but "filthy";[1] the reference being in fact to the "snake-skin" that Kṛtyā must be thought of as shedding when she "has gotten feet" (*padvatī bhūtvī*), all in accordance with the well known formula for procession from ophidian potentiality to human actuality: or that in JUB. 1. 38. 4 *śāmūla-parṇabhyām* is not, as rendered by Oertel, "with a woollen shirt (?) and a leaf," but "(clad) in dirty leaves."

Samudda (as *adhivacanam* of *nibbāna*). In Buddhism, as in Brahmanism, the Pilgrim's "Way" considered as a voyage (*yāna*, in this sense) may be related in three different ways to the flowing river of life and death. The journey is either upstream to the waters' source: or over the waters to a farther shore; or downstream to the sea. This use of symbolisms which are contrary in their literal but unanimous in their spiritual sense very well illustrates the nature of metaphysics itself, which is not like a "philosophy" systematic, but is always consistent. All that we have to be careful of here (as in any work of art) is to make use of our symbols consistently: it is only, for example, in the second case, that of "crossing over," that the symbol of the "bridge" can also be employed; it would be incongruous to speak of the "bridge" in connection with a going up or down stream.[1a]

In the first case, the symbol is of a procedure against the stream, and the Buddhist Wayfarer is accordingly referred to as an "Upstreamer" (*paṭisoto* or *udhaṁsoto*, with *anusotagāmī*, "drifting with the current" as opposite). Without going into the history of the underlying thought at great length, we may observe that in RV. 10. 28. 4 *pratīpaṁ śāpaṁ nadyo vahanti* ("The rivers carry the foam against the current") is already a paradox to be ex-

[1] The Vedic and Brāhmaṇa associations of "wool" are regularly with purity and purification. Sāyaṇa appears to be perfectly correct in his gloss *śāmulyam* = *śāmulam* = *śarīram malaṁ, śarīrāvacchannasya malasya dhārakaṁ vastram*, "foul body, or garment reeking of the foulness of the body that was covered by it."

[1a] Or only if we see in the river itself the "bridge" and Axis Mundi.

plained. Whatever this may mean, the text of TS. 7. 5. 7. 4, "The heavenly world is counter-current (*pratikūlam*) hence" is explicit: and it is precisely in this sense that in PB. 25. 10. 12-16 the Sacrificers, going "countercurrent" or "upstream" (*pratīpam*) along the whole course of the Sarasvatī (the River of Life), reach the heavenly world (it is clear from verse 11 that the Sarasvatī is coincident with the Axis Mundi): [2] it is impossible to reach the goal "downstream." The symbolism here is one of return to the river's source, the Fons Vitae, Varuṇa's abiding place *sindhūnām upodaye* (RV. 8. 41. 2), the "Well of Honey in Viṣṇu's highest place" (*viṣṇoḥ pade parame madhva utsaḥ*, RV. 1. 154. 4), the Perennial Spring of PLOTINUS, *Enneads* 3. 8. 10, etc. Amongst the Christian parallels may be noted Ruysbroeck, "a perpetual striving after the unattainable—this is 'striving against the stream'" (*Sparkling Stone*, Ch. 9, cf. JB. 1. 85 *pratikūlam udyan . . . samaṣṭyā*): Dante, *Purgatorio*, 1. 40, "Against the dark stream fled the eternal prison"; Blake, "Jesus died . . . he strove against the current of this wheel."

More familiar is the symbolism of the "Farther Shore," to be reached in various ways, whether by raft, ship, bridge or ford, and in connection with which we meet with a great variety of terms such as *tara, taraṇa, tārā, tīran, tīrtha,*[3] *trātṛ*, etc., deriving from *tṛ*, to "cross over." In this case the Waters to be crossed are specifically the River of Death (M. 1. 225-7; DhA. 2. 275, etc.), or as more fully explained in S. 4. 174-5, the Great Flood of Water (*mahā udakaṇṇavo*) is the flood of will, birth, opinion and ignorance (*kāma, bhava, diṭṭhi, avijja*), the Hither Shore represents "embodiment" (*sakkāya*), the Farther Shore *nibbāna,*

[2] Coincident then with the Shaft of Light, the Bolt and Sacrificial Post that strikes downwards from the zenith to the nadir of the universe, and which must be reversed by those who would ascend. The digging out and setting upright of the Post in AB. 2. 1-2 etc. has the same spiritual significance as the words "counter-current," etc., discussed above, cf. my "Inverted Tree in *Q.J.Myth.Soc.* 29, pp. 36 f.

[3] *Tīrtha* is "crossing place"; *tīrthakara* virtually synonymous with "Pontifex," "Pontiff." Tārā is "Saviouress," and also "star," cf. the Virgin as Stella Maris. *Trātṛ* is ferryman or saviour. *Taraṇa* is crossing; hence *avataraṇa*, "crossing back," i. e. the "descent" of a Saviour. *Tīran* is "crossing" in S. 5. 24 (where we have "Few are they of mortal men who have reached the Farther Shore"). Our "term," Lat. *terminus* is cognate.

and the "Brahman who has crossed and reached the farther side and stands on solid ground" (*tiṇṇo pāraṁgato thale titthati brāhmaṇo*) is the Arahat. The formula of crossing over to a farther shore or haven of safety occurs so repeatedly in Buddhist and Brahmanical contexts alike that no further examples need be cited here. The metaphor of the saving "ship" (Pāli and Skr. *nāvā*) is preserved in our "nave" (of a church).[4]

Less familiar, though by no means rare in Buddhist contexts is the metaphor of a gliding downstream to a *nibbāna* represented by the Sea, not here as mass of waters to be crossed, but itself the last end. This value of *samudda* (Sea) is overlooked in the PTS Dictionary. In S. 5. 39-40, we find "Just as rivers lean, tend and gravitate towards the sea" (*samudda-ninnā, -poṇā, -pabbhārā*)[5] just so the Almsman who cultivates the Aryan Eightfold Path "leans, tends and gravitates towards Nibbāna"; similarly S. 5. 134. In the same way in the parable of the Log, S. 4. 179-180, floating downstream on the Ganges is gliding towards Nibbāna; the dangers are of stranding on either shore, being taken by those (men or gods) who dwell on these shores,[6] stranding on a shoal (*thale ussīdissati*),[7] sinking in mid-stream (*majjhe saṁsīdissati*),[8]

[4] As in the well known Parable of the Raft (M. 1. 135) the crossing over is here by means of a raft, for which there is no more use when the Farther Shore has been reached, and as in Rev. 21. 1 "there was no more sea." The Waters to be crossed are represented in the Gospels (John 6, etc.) by the Sea of Galilee; cf. Norman Brown, *Walking on the Water*, 1928, pp. 20 ff.

[5] The words *-ninnā, -poṇā, -pabbhārā* or their equivalents, *mutatis mutandis*, occur elsewhere, notably in the well known metaphor of the rafters that converge towards and rest in the roof-plate of the dome and it is thus that the powers of the soul converge towards and come to rest in *samādhi* (ŚAr. 8; M. 1. 322-323; Mil. 38, etc.

[6] The interpretation (*adhivacanam*) of "This shore" is *ajjhatikam āyatanānam* and of "That shore" *bāhirānam āyatanānam*, i. e. these internal (microcosmic) and those external (macrocosmic) conditions. This provides us with good evidence for what can be inferred in many other contexts, viz. that *ajjhatikam . . . bāhiram* correspond to *adhyātmam . . . adhidevatam* as, e. g. in JUB. 3. 33, where the two words has precisely the implication of "subjective" and "objective" that is fundamental to Pāli *ajjhatikam* and *bāhiram*, as in M. 1. 421, where the five elements as they are within you (i. e. microcosmically) are contrasted with the same as they are outside you (i. e. macrocosmically).

[7] Observe that *thale* ("aground") here has the exactly opposite spiritual meaning of *thale* ("safe ashore") in S. 4. 175-5 cited above. In this connection cf. René Guénon, "Du double sens des symboles" in *Études Traditionelles*, 42, 1923.

[8] "Drowning in the nether waters"; here the symbolism coincides with that of

or of rotting within, and if all these dangers are avoided, then shall ye lean, tend and gravitate towards Nibbāna." It is clear that the stream is here no longer Māra's as in M. 1. 226 (*mārassa sotā*), but much rather the Flood of Merit (*puññassa dhārā*) of A. 2. 56. In S. 5. 47, cf. 63, young followers of the Eightfold Path are compared to the young Nāgas (snakes, or rather eels, see "Nāga") born in the Himālayas and who as they grow bigger make their way down to the Sea and there attain their full dimensions, the Commentary equating *nāga* with *yogāvacāra* and *samudda* with *nibbāna*. In DhA. 3. 230 f. the significance of the downstream voyage, here in a boat, is the same, but the value of "*nāga*" is reversed;[9] because of a sin by which the voyage is interrupted the novice is reborn as the Nāga Erakāpatha.

Finally, the foregoing texts in which *samudda* = *nibbāna*, and even more literally Udāna 55 "Just as rivers lose their former names and clan-names (*purimāni nāma-gottāni*)[10] when they reach the sea, and it is accounted only 'The Great Sea'" correspond exactly to the better known "Just as these flowing rivers that tend towards the sea, when they reach the sea are gone home, and their name and aspect (*nāma-rūpe*) are broken up, and only 'The Sea' (*samudram iti*) is spoken of" (*Praśna Up.* 6. 5, etc.), as well as to the almost identical images employed by Dante, Eckhart and Ruysbroeck.[11]

crossing over, and if one falls from the ship or bridge or if he sinks whilst "walking on the water" he may be drowned.

[9] The two values of "*nāga*" are the same as those of JB. 3. 77 and PB. 25. 15. 4 where a distinction is made between those snakes (*ahi*) that are "left behind" (*ahīyata*) and the others (*sarpa*) who, inasmuch as they "creep on farther" (*atisarpanti*) vanquish death and become Ādityas (like the Buddha, *ādicca-bandhu*).

[10] Cf. JB. 1. 18. 5-6, *Taṁ hāgatam pṛcchati, kas tvam asi. Sa yo ha nāmnā vā gotreṇa vā prabrūte . . . taṁ ṛtavas . . . padgṛhītam apakarṣanti*,—i. e. if in answer to the question "Who art thou?" he answers by his own or his clan-name, he is dragged away by the representatives of time. For many other parallels see my "Ākiṁcañña: Self-naughting."

[11] Cited in my "New Approach to the Vedas," pp. 45, 46. It may be added that in JB. 1. 173-175 where the Sacrificers are on their way to heaven and ask "Who shall be able today to swim away out of the open jaws of the crocodile?", and this is with reference to the "crocodile standing in the one and only way, against the current, with open maw" (*ekāyane siṁśumārī pratīpaṁ vyādāya tiṣṭhati*), *pratīpam* (adv.) refers to the position of the crocodile, it is clear that the motion of the sacri-

It may be added that where symbolism of a going downstream to the Sea is employed as above, a return to the source would be equivalent to "backsliding" (*apāya*), and that we actually find the expressions "countercurrent" and "back-flowing" used accordingly in AV. 10. 1. 7 where the evil powers are enjoined to return "upstream counter-current" (*pratikūlam udāyyam*) and AV. 4. 17. 2 where *punaḥsara* = apotropaic.

Sahājanetta. Sn. 1096: two Mss. read *sahajanetta*. We should render "possessed of the innate eye," i. e. as the Commentator implies, "of spontaneous omniscience." We do not agree with the Dictionary's "lit. 'coinciding eye,'" but take *sahaja* in its usual sense of "connatural," "inborn," and hence as in the later rhetoric, not acquired (*ahāryā*) or learnt (*aupadeśikā*) but "natural" (*sahajā*) illumination (*pratibhā*). That is the terminology of the *Kāvyamīmāṁsa*, Ch. 2, where also *sahaja* is equated with *sārasvata*, tantamount to "communicated by Sophia." The parallel as regards *pratibhā* is fully justified by M. 1. 240 "There flashed upon me spontaneously three parables unheard ere now" (*tisso upamā paṭibhaṁsu anacchariyā-pubbe assutapubbā*). This is, of course, a quite different thing from the ability of the charioteer, well versed and expert in his art, to answer any question on the subject "on the spot" (*ṭhānaso*), without "taking counsel" (*cetaso parivitakkam*); though this facility born of application and practice provides an analogy for the Buddha's ability to "answer on the spot" (*ṭhānaso . . . paṭibhāti*) as he can because "he has fully penetrated the realm of the Law" (*dhammadhātu . . . suppaṭividdhā*, M. 1. 396), or as elsewhere stated because he *is* the Law (S. 3. 120 *yo dhammam passati mam passati*, cf. D. 3. 84). There are other ways in which the Buddha's power of immediate response is expressed, for example S. 2. 105, "'Origination, origination': so saying, there arose in me, brethren, a vision in matters of the Law unheard ere now (*pubbe ananussu-*

ficers themselves, on the one way, is downstream to the sea: the crocodile (*siṁśumārin* = *makara* = *mṛtyu* = *sūrya*) being the keeper of the Gate, which is in this case the "mouth" of the river (as we should say, although it is rather the mouth of the sea into which the river pours).

tesu dhammesu cakkhum udapāde), gnosis, prescience, science, light arose (*ñānam, paññā, vijjā, āloko udapāde*)." Observe that "unheard before," while implying literally "not to be found in *śruti*, and therefore to be regarded as *smṛti*," does not imply "original" in our individualistic sense which conceives of a property in ideas, but an exegesis suited to the present conditions and audience, and authoritative precisely because "original" (*yoniso*) in the true sense of the word, that of "deriving from the source"; it is not a question of what we call "inspiration" but rather of infallibility,[1] comparable to that of the Christ when he says "As my Father hath taught me, I speak" (John 8.28), or that of St. Paul when he says "I have the mind (*νοῦς*) of Christ" (1 Cor. 2.16).

Sahajanetta can also be explained in agreement with what has been said above, but as having a more explicit reference to the epithet *cakkhuṁ loke*, "Eye in the World,"[2] so often applied to the Buddha in other contexts, an epithet that in pre- and non-Buddhist contexts would be applicable only to the Sun or Agni; in this case *sahajanetta* would be more literally "Born as the Eye," or "Eye by Nature" than "possessed of the innate eye." The distinction is hardly material.

Suññatā. "Emptiness" (*suññatā*) in Pāli contexts is not the metaphysical Zero (Non-being as the principle of Being, Infinite Possibility as distinguished from Indefinite Actuality), but a characteristic of this world, as in S. 4. 295-296, where it has been explained that when the Almsman returns from a deathlike Contemplation in which consciousness and feeling have been arrested, "three touches touch him," "emptiness" (*suññato-*), "form-

[1] D. 3. 127, Nothing is to be added to or taken away from the promulgated Dhamma; D. 3. 135, All that the Tathāgata has said, from the night of the Awakening to that of the Total Despiration, "all that is just so and infallible" (*sabbaṁ taṁ tath'eva hoti, no aññathā*).

[2] *Cakkhuṁ loke* is not noted in the Dictionary. It occurs in D. 2. 159, Sn. 599 etc. Cf. S. 1. 138 *buddhacakkhunā lokaṁ volokento*; S. 1. 134, *sabbam passati cakkhunā*. Out of countless Brahmanical texts I cite only AB. 1. 6 "The Eye is the Truth deposited amongst men" (with reference to Agni), and RV. 7. 61. 1 *cakṣur . . . sūryas . . . abhi yo viśvā bhuvanāni caṣṭe*. With *sahajanetta, cakkhuṁ loke*, etc., cf. *cakkhubhūto ñāna-bhūto* in M. 1. 111, S. 2. 255 etc.

lessness" (*animitto-*) and "making no plans" (*appaṇihito-phasso*), and he discriminates (*viveka*) accordingly: and the meaning of "emptiness" is explained, "Emancipation of the Will by Emptiness (*suññatā ceto-vimutti*) being consequent upon the realisation that "This world is empty of spirit or anything spiritual" (*suññam idam attena vā attaniyena vā*); *suññatā* is synonymous with *anattā*, of which it really only paraphrases and isolates the privative *an*. It is no doubt in the same sense that in A. 1. 72 "the texts are coupled with 'emptiness'" (*suttantā . . . sunnatā-paṭisaññutā*); there is, in fact, nothing more characteristic of Buddhist teaching that its constant resort to negatives (above all in the sense of the word *anattā*), which even some contemporary hearers found perplexing. The denial of spirituality to contingent things in particular is a denial of any real essence to these things in themselves, and thus forms the basis of the more sweeping *śūnyavāda* doctrine which in the Mahāyāna denies not any "value" but any essence to even the Buddha's appearance and to the promulgation of the Dhamma itself. If such a doctrine disturbs us, it may be found more palatably expressed in the Vajracchedika Sūtra thus, "Those who see me in the body (*rūpeṇa*) and think of me in sounds (*ghosaiḥ*), their way of thinking is false, they do not see me at all. . . . The Buddha cannot be rightly understood (*rju boddhum*) by any means (*upāyena*)."[1] Not that "means" are not dispositive to a right understanding,[2] but that if regarded as ends, even the most adequate means are a hindrance. In such a radical iconoclasm as this all traditional teachings are finally agreed. What is true of ethics is also true of the supports of contemplation: as in the well-known Parable of the Raft, the means are of no more use when the goal has been reached.

[1] HOERNLE, *MS. remains of Buddhist literature from E. Turkestan*, 1, 270.
[2] Cf. Muṇḍ. Up. 3.2-4 *etair upāyair yatate yastu vidvān . . . viśate brahma-dhāma.*